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Superstitious thoughts or behaviors have been demonstrated to occur frequently and 
persistently in our current population. Typically, they are held or performed in the context of 
an important performance task with the aim to gain good luck or prevent bad luck.  
However, to date, little is known about the reason for the maintenance of this seemingly 
irrational phenomenon, its psychological functions, or its behavioral consequences. The 
current analysis suggests that superstitions exert a causal influence on subsequent task 
performance. In particular, I contend that superstitions associated with the concept of good 
luck that are activated prior to a performance task enhance performance. Furthermore, I 
argue that this influence is explained by the underlying mechanism of increased levels of 
perceived task-specific self-efficacy beliefs. 
Results of one explorative analysis and 5 experimental studies support these 
assumptions. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates the widespread prevalence of superstitions 
within the present population of undergraduate students at the University of Cologne and 
explores several specific superstitions that appear to be particularly common. In each of the 
subsequent studies, these common superstitions such as “lucky charms”, “keeping fingers 
crossed”, or the plain superstitious constructs of good or bad luck are manipulated between 
participants prior to various motor or cognitive performance tasks using manifold empirical 
methods. Results of Studies 2 through 4 demonstrate that performance in a golf-putting task 
or a motor dexterity game indeed is enhanced subsequent to the implementation of a good 
luck superstition, compared to a bad luck superstition or no superstition at all. Studies 5 and 
6 replicate the effect of superstition on superior performance in cognitive tasks such as a 
Tetris-game and a Memory-game. Additionally, the results of these latter studies provide 
empirical evidence for the notion of the mediating function of self-efficacy beliefs on the 
observed effect of superstition on performance.  
In this regard, the reported findings uniquely contribute to our understanding of 
superstitions and their effect on psychological as well as behavioral consequences. The 
present findings are in line with previous research on self-efficacy and performance factors 
in general. At the same time, these findings suggest new questions for future research on the 
subject of superstitions. Possible applications to the athletic or the educational field are 
discussed.  
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 Abergläubische Überzeugungen und Verhaltensweisen sind auch in unserer heutigen 
Gesellschaft noch weit verbreitet. Insbesondere in Situationen, welche durch hohen 
wahrgenommenen psychologischen Stress und Aspekte der Unsicherheit oder 
Unkontrollierbarkeit gekennzeichnet sind, scheint abergläubisches Verhalten immer wieder 
aufzutreten. Damit konsistent sind Befunde, die zeigen, dass vor allem unter Studenten und 
Sportlern, welche in Prüfungen oder Wettkämpfen besonders häufig den beschriebenen 
Situationen ausgesetzt sind, ein hohes Maß an Aberglauben zu finden ist. Was ist der Grund 
für das vermehrte Vorkommen und die konstante Aufrechterhaltung dieser scheinbar 
irrationalen Gedanken und Verhaltensweisen? Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, Evidenz 
für einen tatsächlichen Nutzen dieser abergläubischen Überzeugungen zu finden. Dabei soll 
insbesondere untersucht werden, ob Aberglauben einen Einfluss auf nachfolgende 
Leistungen ausüben, indem sie diese erhöhen. Darauf aufbauend möchte ich untersuchen, 
durch welchen zugrunde liegenden Mechanismus ein solcher Effekt vermittelt wird. Dabei 
wird die Annahme gemacht, dass die kausale Beziehung von aktiviertem Aberglaube auf 
Leistungsverbesserung auf einer Beeinflussung der wahrgenommenen 
Selbstwirksamkeitsüberzeugung basiert. 
Die Befunde aus 6 empirischen Untersuchungen bestätigen meine Vorhersagen 
weitestgehend. Dabei bekräftigen die Ergebnisse der ersten Untersuchung – einer 
explorativen Fragebogen Studie – die weite Verbreitung von abergläubischen 
Überzeugungen speziell für die hier untersuchte Stichprobe bestehend aus Studenten der 
Universität zu Köln und identifiziert darüber hinaus einige konkrete Aberglauben, welche 
von besonders vielen Probanden als effektive empfunden werden. Die am weitesten 
verbreiteten Formen von Aberglauben (Daumen drücken, Glücksbringer dabei haben, an die 
Konzepte Glück und Pech glauben) wurden in den folgenden Untersuchungen herangezogen 
und anhand verschiedener methodischer Vorgehensweisen experimentell manipuliert. Im 
Anschluss wurde die erbrachte Leistung der Teilnehmer in verschiedenen motorischen oder 
kognitiven Aufgaben erfasst. So zeigt sich in den Experimenten 2 und 3, dass Teilnehmer 
besser in der Lage sind Golf zu spielen (häufigeres Treffen) wenn sie diese Aufgabe mit 
einem angeblichen Glücksball verglichen mit einem angeblichen Pechball oder einem 
neutralen Ball durchführen. Ähnlich zeigt sich in Experiment 4, dass Teilnehmer denen die 
  #D
Daumen gedrückt werden ein Geduldspiel schneller vervollständigen können als Teilnehmer 
zweier Kontrollbedingungen. 
Die Ergebnisse der Experimente 5 und 6 replizieren zunächst den leistungserhöhenden 
Einfluss von mit Glück assoziiertem Aberglaube auf kognitive Leistungen. So zeigt sich in 
Experiment 5, dass Teilnehmer, bei denen zuvor das Konzept Glück aktiviert wurde, eine 
bessere Leistung in einem Tetris-Spiel erbringen (mehr Reihen aufbauen) als wenn sie zuvor 
mit dem Wort Pech geprimt wurden – selbst wenn dieses Priming subliminal, das heißt 
außerhalb ihrer bewussten Wahrnehmung stattfindet. Die Ergebnisse des Experiments 6 
demonstrieren, dass die Teilnehmer in Anwesenheit ihres persönlichen Glücksbringers 
besser in einem Memory-Spiel abschneiden als in Abwesenheit dieses Objektes. Darüber 
hinaus zeigt die statistische Analyse der Daten beider Studien, dass der Effekt des 
Aberglaubens auf Leistungsmaße durch ein erhöhtes Niveau der empfundenen 
aufgabenspezifischen Selbstwirksamkeit vermittelt wird.  
Die dargestellten Befunde dieser Dissertation zeichnen sich insbesondere durch die 
Anwendung vielfältiger Methoden sowie die Neuartigkeit der gefundenen Ergebnisse aus. In 
diesem Sinne kann die vorliegende Arbeit maßgeblich zum Verständnis abergläubischer 
Überzeugungen und Verhaltensweisen sowie deren Einfluss auf psychologische und 
verhaltensbasierte Konsequenzen beitragen. Die dargestellten Ergebnisse sind mit früheren 
Forschungsbefunden zum Konstrukt der Selbstwirksamkeitsüberzeugung sowie zu 
leistungsbeeinflussenden Faktoren im Allgemeinen konsistent. Gleichzeitig gehen aus ihnen 
jedoch auch zahlreiche Fragestellungen für zukünftige Forschungsarbeiten zum Thema 
Aberglaube hervor. Eine mögliche Anwendung der vorliegenden Befunde im pädagogischen 
Bereich von Schule und Sport wird zum Abschluss der Arbeit diskutiert.  
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"To succeed, one cannot afford to be a realist." 
~ Albert Bandura ~ 
Address before the American Psychological Association, 1998 
 
There are many situations in life where it is important to perform at one’s best. When 
we graduate from school or university, for example, our performance in the final exams 
might determine whether we get the job we are hoping for or whether someone else is 
luckier than we. Similarly, whether athletes find a sponsor or qualify for an important event 
such as the Olympic Games, for example, usually depends on their achieved performance in 
prior competitions. In light of the importance of a good performance, most people would 
approach these kind of situations as well-prepared as possible. That is, many students study 
extensively prior to an exam. Similarly, prior to a competition or a tournament, athletes 
practice their routines repeatedly and train to improve their physical condition. However, no 
matter how well prepared people are in such performance situations, there arel always some 
factors that are not under their control. Students, for example, have no influence over the 
questions that are asked in the exam. Athletes have to face opponents or conditions (e.g. 
weather, equipment quality) that are determined by external, uncontrollable factors. This 
lack of control oftentimes provides a lack of confidence (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978; Maier & Seligman, 1976), which in turn is just as necessary for an excellent 
performance as studying or training (Bandura, 1977; Carver & Scheier, 1981, 2002). What 
can we do to retain a feeling of control and confidence?  
One way of dealing with situations like this could simply be to hope for and rely on an 
extra bit of good luck, which could help to reach the aspired performance standard. Even 
though, by definition, luck is nothing else but chance, people go much further than simply 
hoping for good luck. In fact, many of them actually engage in certain kinds of thinking or 
behavior to gain that extra bit of good luck or prevent bad luck from happening (Jahoda, 
1969; Vyse, 1997; Womack, 1992). Throughout his whole career, Michael Jordan (a 
graduate from North Carolina), for example, always wore his old blue North Carolina shorts 
under his actual NBA uniform for good luck. Similar, the famous tennis player Bjorn Borg 
would not shave if he was winning during a tournament. Golf pro Tiger Woods tries to gain 
the extra bit of good fortune by wearing a red shirt on Sundays, which is usually the last day 
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of a tournament. Superstitions also are observed among many people outside of the public 
view. Thus, it is not uncommon for people to carry lucky charms (Epstein, 1993; Wiseman 
& Watt, 2004), knock on wood (Blum & Blum, 1974; Keinan, 2002), keep their fingers 
crossed (Vyse, 1997), or avoid walking under ladders (Blum & Blum, 1974; Pole, Berenson, 
Sass, Young, & Blass, 1974).  
Previous research on superstitious thinking and behavior has examined various factors 
that contribute to this phenomenon. Much of the work focused on the following three 
questions: What kinds of superstitious and magical thinking exist? Who are the people that 
are especially prone to superstitions? Which circumstances are especially likely to elicit 
superstitious thinking and acting? However, despite the ubiquity of this phenomenon, little is 
known yet about the psychological function of superstitions in performance-related 
situations. To remedy this shortcoming, the present thesis attempts to specify the actual 
consequences of superstitions on performance outcomes as well as the mechanisms 
underlying these effects. 
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Despite the fact that superstitious beliefs and behaviors are widespread, research on this 
phenomenon can still be described as rather rare. One reason might be that superstitious and 
magical thinking is perceived as an extremely discouraging research topic (Scheibe & 
Sarbin, 1965). For Campbell (1996), superstitious belief and practice represents a problem 
with no ready solution. Others even perceive superstitious and magical thinking as “a label 
for a residual category – a garbage bin filled with various odds and ends that we do not 
otherwise know what to do with” (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000, p. 1). Another reason why to 
date there is only a limited amount of empirical research on superstitions could be that these 
behaviors are often associated with embarrassment (Van Raalte, Brewer, Nemeroff, & 
Linder, 1991; Vyse, 1997) and thus are difficult to assess. Undoubtedly, many people are 
reluctant to confess their superstitions, which are typically exercised in private, for fear of 
negative evaluation (Vyse, 1997). Nevertheless, there is some existing data, that suggests a 
wide spreading of this phenomenon over various times and cultures (for reviews see Jahoda, 
1969; Vyse, 1997; Zusne & Jones, 1989). Thus, about 30 years ago, surveys in Britain 
(Abercrombie, Baker, Brett, & Foster, 1970) as well as in the U.S. (Gallup, 1984) reported 
that about one third of the respondents indicated that they were at least a little superstitious. 
But how about today? 
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Instead of gradually fading as some theorists would have expected (Campbell, 1996), 
superstitious thinking actually seems to have increased over the last few decades. Indeed, a 
more recent Gallup poll (Newport & Strausberg, 2001) reported that now more than half 
(53%) of the American population admits to being at least somewhat superstitious. In a 
recent poll in Great Britain (Wiseman, 2003), it is even more than three quarters (77%) of 
the respondents who reportedly are somewhat superstitious. Similar degrees of superstitions 
have been observed in the German population with 51% of the interviewees holding 
superstitious beliefs (Lachmann, 2005).  
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Interestingly, here as well as in most of the previously reported surveys, the percentage 
of people who report to engage in a certain superstitious behavior (e.g. touching wood, avoid 
ladders, fingers crossed) surpasses the amount of professed beliefs (Abercrombie et al., 
1970; Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 2000; Gallup, 1984). Moreover, in many other 
studies people admit to engaging in manifold superstitious behaviors but at the same time 
rate them as not necessarily very effective (Bleak & Frederick, 1998; Rudski & Edwards, 
2007). Thus, it seems that superstitions and magical thinking involve “half beliefs” 
(Campbell, 1996; McKellar, 1952) which are held by people even though they are aware that 
such thoughts are irrational (Pronin, Wegner, McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2006; Risen & 
Gilovich, 2007). Why would so many people engage in superstitious behaviors even though 
they deny truly believing in them? One answer could be that people act on the principle of 
Pascal’s wager. Blaise Pascal, a seventeenth-century French philosopher and mathematician 
reasoned that even if there only is a small possibility concerning the existence of heaven and 
hell, it might be the safest strategy to protect against the risk of damnation by living a 
Christian life. Applying this notion to superstitions, it seems that people think they should 
perform the superstitious behavior – just in case it might help (Jahoda, 2007; Killeen, 1977). 
Another possibility is that engaging in superstitious behavior has a function on its own 
(Keiran, 2002; Neil, 1980). To explore this function more extensively, it might be helpful to 
first have a look at the findings concerning the demographics and emergence of 
superstitions.  
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Existing research on superstitions goes much farther than simply documenting its 
existence. Rather, numerous correlations between superstitions and demographic factors or 
personality traits have been identified (Blum & Blum, 1974; Epstein, 1991; Killeen, 
Wildman, & Wildman, 1974; Tobacyk & Shrader, 1991; Tobacyk, Nagot, & Miller, 1988). 
Whereas some of these findings are very consistent, others vary across studies.  
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Many findings suggest that women are more superstitious than men (Blum & Blum, 
1974; Buhrmann & Zaugg, 1981; Conklin, 1919). In a study conducted during the 1972 
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Olympic Games in Munich, for example, Burn (1975) found that of all German athletes who 
possessed a mascot, 72 percent were females. Contradicting these findings, however, are the 
results of Buhrmann and colleagues (Buhrmann, Brown, & Zaugg, 1982), which revealed no 
differences between male and female basketball players in neither the total amount of 
superstitions held, nor the overall degree of superstitiousness. Another study even found that 
male hockey players held more superstitious beliefs and practices than female players (Neil, 
Anderson, & Sheppard, 1981).  
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Also inconsistent are the findings on the relationship between age and superstitions. 
Again, whereas some work suggests that younger adults are more superstitious than older 
age groups (Corrigan, Pattison, & Lester, 1980; Gallup & Newport, 1990), other studies 
suggest an increase of superstitious beliefs with increasing age (Epstein, 1993). 
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An almost identical picture appears upon inspection of the association between the 
formal level of education and the acceptance of superstitious beliefs. While some researcher 
concluded that there was no effect of education on paranormal beliefs (Jahoda, 1968; Salter 
& Routledge, 1971), others found evidence for a negative relation between superstitious 
beliefs and years of study (Blum & Blum, 1974; Otis & Alcock, 1982).  
Taken together, these contradictory findings make it difficult to draw valid inferences 
from demographic factors on the appearance of superstitious thinking and practicing.  
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In contrast to the results concerning the prevalence of superstitions depending on 
demographic factors, previous findings on the relationship between certain personality 
characteristics and superstitions seem to be much clearer. Thus, for example, numerous 
studies reported more superstitions and irrational beliefs among people with lowered 
capacity for critical thinking, less-skilled logical reasoning, and lower IQs (Alcock & Otis, 
1980; Killen et al., 1974; Wierzbicki, 1985). Furthermore, it has been suggested that higher 
levels of superstition correlate with higher levels of conservatism (Boshier, 1973a; 1973b), 
higher levels of trait anxiety (Epstein, 1991; Wolfradt, 1997), lower levels of self-efficacy 
(Tobacyk & Shrader, 1991), and an external locus of control (Dag, 1999; Peterson, 1978; 
Schippers & Van Lange, 2006; Tobacyk et al., 1988).  
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Taken together, these findings suggest that the tendency to develop superstitious 
thoughts and behaviors is primarily associated with rather poor psychological adjustment. 
However, even though these findings seem to be rather consistent, they should still be 
viewed carefully. In most of these studies, superstitious beliefs were assessed by using the 
superstition subscale of the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004; Tobacyk & Milford, 
1983). This instrument, however, only consists of items assessing so-called “negative” 
superstition which refer to “bad luck” (e.g. breaking a mirror, the number 13, black cats) and 
neglects “positive” superstitions which refer to lucky events (e.g. carry a charm, crossing 
fingers, touching wood). Wiseman and Watt (2004) conducted an empirical study 
demonstrating that these positive superstitions matter too. Overall, superstitions related to 
“good luck” were endorsed more often and revealed a more favorable pattern on several 
individual difference measures (e.g. life satisfaction, neuroticism) than did superstitions 
related to “bad luck”. This finding suggests that the maladaptive nature of superstitions, 
which has often been suggested (Alcock, 1981; Dag, 1999), might not be the whole truth. 
Rather, some researchers have begun to revaluate the functions of superstitious beliefs and 
behavior and argue that superstitions may just as well be adaptive (Becker, 1975; Neil, 1980, 
1982; Keinan, 2002; Rudski, 2001; Rudski & Edwards, 2007; Vyse, 1997; Wiseman, 2004). 
This perspective seems especially plausible if one has a look at the groups of people who are 
traditionally and particularly attracted by superstitions (Vyse, 1997). 
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So who are the people that seem to be especially likely to exhibit superstitions? Next to 
gamblers, sailors, financial investors, and soldiers (Hayano, 1978; Henslin, 1967; Stouffer et 
al., 1949; Vyse, 1997), two groups particularly susceptible to superstitions are athletes 
(Becker, 1975; Neil, 1980; Todd & Brown, 2003; Womack, 1992) and students (Albas & 
Albas, 1989; Blum & Blum, 1974; Vyse, 1997).  
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Assessing the level of superstitions in student populations, Gmelch and Felson (1980) 
as well as Gallagher and Lewis (2001) reported that nearly 70% of the students who 
participated in their studies had engaged in superstitious rituals. Similar results were reported 
by Saenko (2004) for Russian students. An additional interesting finding was reported by 
Albas and Albas (1989), who demonstrated that the great majority of superstitions held by 
students were intended to bring “good luck” rather than ward off “bad luck.” The authors 
also reported that the superstitions exhibited were highly private and idiosyncratic instead of 
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socially and culturally shared. The specific behaviors ranged from wearing particular pieces 
of clothes, jewelry, or perfume to using special pens or eating certain kinds of food. An 
especially compelling anecdote tells of one student who was reluctant to take an exam until 
he had found a “lucky” coin around the bus stop, even at the risk of being late.  
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Despite the high prevalence of superstitions in the context of exams, students seem to 
engage in behavioral rituals even more extensively when it comes to athletic competitions 
(Rudski & Edwards, 2007). Several studies on high school, college, or university athletic 
teams reveal a similar high level of superstitions across different types of sport such as 
baseball (Ciborowski, 1997), basketball (Buhrmann & Zaugg, 1981, 1983), hockey (Neil et 
al., 1981), gymnastics, track, and American football (Bleak & Frederick, 1998), or 
volleyball, swimming, and tennis (Gregory & Petrie, 1975). However, not just student 
athletes but also professional baseball players (Burger & Lynn, 2005; Gmelch, 1974) as well 
as football, volleyball, and hockey players (Schippers & Van Lange, 2006) frequently 
exercise superstitious practices. Some differences across diverse types of sport appear in the 
kind of superstitions that are engaged (Bleak & Frederick, 1998). Gregory and Petrie (1975), 
for example, report different superstitions for team sport athletes than for individual sport 
athletes. Whereas the former exhibited more superstitions related to equipment, for example, 
the latter exhibited more superstitions related to wearing lucky charms.  
In sum, these findings indicate that superstitions seem to play an especially important 
role in the worlds of athletes and students. What are the reasons for the high prevalence of 
superstitious thoughts and practices among these particular populations? In order to answer 
this question it might be helpful to have a closer look at characteristics that are shared by 
both groups.  
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Taken together, when having a look at athletes and students as the people particularly 
likely to execute superstitions, it is interesting to note two things: First, despite the fact that 
superstitions apparently are associated with rather poor personality characteristics, these 
people actually seem to be especially well adjusted and skillful in coping with required tasks. 
In fact, the majority of athletes as well as students seem to do rather well in arranging their 
living conditions and adjusting to specific life circumstances. Moreover, in order to be a 
successful athlete or student, existing coping strategies seem to be necessarily required. 
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From this perspective it seems possible that the frequently observed superstitions in these 
specific populations are helpful rather than solely maladaptive. 
Second, a main similarity shared by athletes and students is that both often face 
situations in a performance context. No matter whether it is about an exam or a sporting 
event, the achieved performance is considered very important. In fact, next to perceived 
importance, these performance-related situations of students and athletes seem to share 
several additional characteristics. In both cases, the achieved outcomes are subject to 
external evaluations by experts such as teachers, professors, or athletic judges. Furthermore, 
in most cases, students and athletes only have a limited number of opportunities to 
demonstrate their performance. Thus, students usually are allowed only one attempt to 
express their answer to a question or to take a specific exam. Similarly, within one 
competition an athlete only gets once the chance to present a performance or to run a race. 
The outcome of this single event might then have important consequences and may 
determine one’s future. Depending on the achievement in the specific test or exam, a student 
may or may not be permitted to visit an advanced class. Similarly, an athlete may or may not 
stay on the team or become qualified for a more prestigious competition depending on the 
achieved performance. In light of these characteristics and the resulting pressure, 
physiological tension, and feelings of anxiety (Schippers & Van Lange, 1996; Treasure, 
Monson, & Lox, 1996) they produce, it may not be surprising that students and athletes seek 
help from external sources such as superstitions. In fact, additional research on the 
development of superstition revealed that these seemingly irrational thoughts and practices 
most likely occur in situations that are very similar to the performance-related situations 
faced by students and athletes. The following paragraphs will examine specific situational 
circumstances under which superstitions seem to arise and focus on potential beneficial 
functions of superstitious thoughts and practices.  
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In many views, situational and environmental variables may be even more important to 
understanding the mechanisms and functions of superstition than the personality variables 
summarized above. Several researchers have examined specific circumstances under which 
the endorsement of superstitions becomes more or less likely (Jahoda, 1969; Vyse, 1997). 
Their findings indicate that superstitions appear most often under conditions of 
psychological stress, uncertainty, and low control (Case, Fitness, Cairns, & Stevenson, 2004; 
Malinowski, 1954; Keinan, 1994; Rudski & Edwards, 2007; Vyse, 1997), which are similar 
to those characteristics used to describe performance situations for students and athletes. One 
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of the first pieces of evidence for this notion comes from Malinowski’s (1954) observations, 
who found that Trobriand islanders did not exhibit superstitious behavior when fishing in the 
safe lagoon where they had a high rate of success. However, when the very same islanders 
fished in the open sea, where there were more dangers and a lower success rate, superstitious 
behaviors were observed. Similar, Padgett and Jorgenson (1982) reported a direct 
relationship between the appearance of magical thinking and the severity of economic threat 
in Germany between the two World Wars. More examples of the close relationship between 
the appearance of superstitions and uncertain, uncontrollable, and highly stressful demands 
are found in the realm of sports.  
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Comparable to the observations above, superstitions in sport also tend to arise when the 
outcome of an event seems to depend on external factors that are outside of the athletes’ 
control. In his analysis of baseball-related superstitions, Gmelch (1971) found that 
superstitions hardly occur in fielding, where the success rate is close to 98 percent. However, 
when it comes to hitting and pitching, where the rate of success is much lower and seems to 
depend on luck and other external circumstances, superstitions are frequently exhibited. 
Professional athletes in a scenario study indicated higher commitment to superstitious rituals 
the more important the game was perceived and the more uncertainty was experienced prior 
to the game (Schippers & Van Lange, 2006). Similar, Ciborowski (1997) reported a high rate 
of superstitious practices when games were close or when a team was about to lose, but not 
when a team was leading comfortably. Additionally, evidence has been gathered 
demonstrating that athletes for whom the stakes are highest are most likely to engage in 
superstitious behavior (Buhrmann & Zaugg, 1981; Neil et al., 1981). Thus, superstitions are 
more prevalent the higher the competitive level, the greater the personal involvement, and 
the longer athletes had trained in their sports. For example, hockey players who practiced or 
played six times a week exhibited almost twice as many superstitions as players who only 
practiced once or twice a week and played in a lower league (Neil et al., 1981). Furthermore, 
superior teams as well as better individual athletes within a team exhibited more 
superstitious behavior than inferior teams or poorly performing individual athletes 
(Buhrmann & Zaugg, 1981).  
In sum, one can conclude from these analyses that athletes are most likely to engage in 
superstitions when the stakes are highest and when they have the most to loose. That is, 
superstitions are most often observed when the outcome of their athletic performance is 
highly important for the athletes themselves and may have an influence on future aspects of 
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their athletic career. As demonstrated above, these kinds of situations often come with a 
sense of low control and perceived psychological stress (Treasure et al., 1996), which are 
exactly those variables that have been demonstrated to elicit superstitions in other domains 
of life.  
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In fact, in a different line of research outside the world of sport, Keinan (1994) 
presented results indicating that psychological stress and conditions of uncertainty are main 
predictors of superstitions. He demonstrated that during the Golf War, Israeli citizens who 
lived in cities with high exposure to missile attacks, thus living in highly stressful conditions, 
engaged more frequently in magical thinking than citizens who lived in cities with no 
exposure to missile attacks. This finding was later replicated in a controlled study (Keinan, 
2002). Here, students of the Tel Aviv University were approached either half an hour prior to 
an exam (high stress condition) or on a regular study day (low stress condition). Participants 
were interviewed with several questions, some of which were especially designed to elicit 
the superstitious behavior “knocking on wood”. For example, participants were asked 
whether they had ever been involved in a fatal road accident. The experimenter recorded 
whether the participants then knocked on wood. As predicted, Keinan (2002) found that 
participants in the high stress condition knocked on wood more often than those in the low 
stress condition. Another string of evidence that points in a similar direction stems from 
studies in which superstitious behavior was experimentally induced by creating 
environments of uncontrollability. 
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The previous findings demonstrated that superstitions often occur naturally in situations 
of psychological stress and under circumstances that are inherently perceived as 
uncontrollable (Jahoda, 1969; Vyse, 1997). Additional evidence suggests that superstitious 
behavior can also be induced experimentally by creating exactly these kinds of situational 
circumstances (Catania & Cutts, 1963; Ono, 1987). In his seminal study, Skinner (1948) 
demonstrated that in uncontrollable reinforcement situations, even pigeons develop 
superstitions. In his investigations, Skinner provided food reinforcement to pigeons in 
intervals of 15 seconds. After a few minutes, the pigeons started to execute distinctive 
stereotypic rituals even though reinforcement was completely independent of the pigeons’ 
behavior. These rituals consisted exactly of those behaviors that were temporally contiguous 
with the application of the food reinforcement. Thus, one pigeon walked around in circles, 
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another jumped from one side of the cage to another, and so on. Superstitious behavior in 
humans as a result of uncontrollable reinforcement has since been replicated several times 
(Catania & Cutts, 1963; Ono, 1987; Rudski, Lischer, & Alert, 1999; Wright, 1962).  
Further findings demonstrate that superstitions not only develop as results of 
uncontrollability within a given situation but also because personal factors such as a strong 
desire for control (Burger, 1986, 1989). Thus, Van Raalte and her colleagues (1991), for 
example, demonstrated that those students who believed that their own actions exert some 
control over chance events were most likely to exhibit superstitious behavior. Specifically, 
participants in this study performed 50 trials of a golf putting task in which they chose one of 
four different colored golf balls for each putt. Each time a participant successfully hit the ball 
into the hole and then selected the same color ball for the subsequent putt, their behavior was 
defined as superstitious. As indicated above, this experimental setting with clearly 
uncontrollable outcomes – all participants were without experience in the golf task – 
generated superstitious behavior. This was especially true for those students who most 
strongly believed that choosing the „lucky ball” actually allowed them to regain some 
control over the event. 
In sum, the presented findings provide sufficient evidence for the assumption that 
superstitions are especially likely to occur under circumstances of low controllability, high 
psychological stress and feelings of uncertainty. From this perspective, it seems natural to 
argue that these seemingly irrational thoughts and behaviors actually serve a specific benefit. 
Clearly, not only for students and athletes but for everyone in a demanding performance 
context, the most beneficial functioning of superstitious thoughts and behaviors would be a 
direct effect of superstitions on performance enhancement. This notion will be debated more 
detailed in the following paragraph. 
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Given that students and athletes more often than other groups engage in performance-
related situations and that both groups more often than other groups engage in superstitious 
beliefs and behaviors, the question arises whether these superstitions actually exert an 
influence on achieved performance. In fact, when asked for the reasons for their 
superstitions, many of the students (Albas & Albas, 1989; Vyse, 1997) as well as the athletes 
(Ciborowski, 1997; Womack, 1981) reported engaging in superstitious thoughts and 
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practices in order to improve their performance. By far, they are not the only ones to propose 
this assumption. Neil (1980) argued that superstitions function as a “psychological placebo.” 
That is, similar to findings in pharmacology (Macedo, Banos, & Farre, 2008) and clinical 
psychology (Rosenthal & Frank, 1956; Shapiro, 1960), the execution of superstitions may 
indeed lead to superior performance simply because one believes in the effect. Keinan (1994, 
2002) explains his findings in a similar way. He suggests that superstitions and magical 
thinking might help the individual to reduce the experienced stress. On a more theoretical but 
not empirically tested level, he also suggests that superstitious thinking can create a self-
fulfilling prophecy: A practiced superstition might increase optimism, decrease stress, and 
thus improve task performance. 
This notion also seems to make sense from a broader point of view. Arguing from an 
evolutionary perspective, which reasons that any kind of behavior will prevail as long as it is 
adaptive (Buss, 2000), one can contend that in order to maintain them, a beneficial function 
of superstitious behaviors seems to be inevitable. The question remains, of course, as to 
whether this benefit manifests itself as an improvement in performance. In fact, apart from 
anecdotal evidence on the part of students or athletes, and speculations similar to those by 
Neil (1980) and Keinan (2002), empirical evidence concerning the effect of superstitions on 
performance enhancement does not exist. Rather, despite the high prevalence of superstitions 
and the knowledge that these behaviors are especially likely to emerge in the context of 
performance tasks, little empirical attention has focused on the relationship between 
superstition and performance at all. 
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As an exception, the only initial empirical evidence supporting the presented 
perspective arises from the work of Helen Matute (1994, 1995) and Thomas Dudley (1999), 
both of whom examined the consequences of superstitions on performance in the face of 
uncontrollable outcomes. While previous research reported the development of learned 
helplessness in response to perceived uncontrollability (Abramson et al., 1978; Hiroto & 
Seligman, 1975; Seligman, Meier, & Solomon, 1971), Matute (1994) and Dudley (1999) 
presented an alternative perspective. They both demonstrated that participants faced with 
uncontrollable tasks tended to exhibit superstitions, which subsequently prevented the 
development of learned helplessness and thus performance impairment. Specifically, Matute 
(1994) found that participants did not develop superstitions if they had control over a loud 
tone. However, yoked subjects in a control condition tended toward superstitious behavior 
during the exposure to the uncontrollable noise. In a subsequent anagram task, the cognitive 
 
$ &&
performance of those participants who had developed superstitions was neither facilitated 
nor impaired in comparison to those who had control over the tone in the first place. Dudley 
(1999) reported similar results. In one of his experiments, he assessed the level of 
superstitious beliefs both before and after exposure to a solvable or unsolvable word puzzle. 
Subsequent to working on an unsolvable task, participants reported an increased level of 
superstition. This was not the case after exposure to a solvable problem. In this regard, this 
finding supports earlier notions arguing that superstitions arise most often in performance-
related situations that include high levels of psychological stress and perceived 
uncontrollability (Rudski et al., 1999; Vyse, 1997). In another study, Dudley (1999) assessed 
participant’s level of superstitious beliefs one week prior to the actual experiment and 
divided them in low and high believers. Similar to the previous study, participants were 
exposed to either a solvable or unsolvable word puzzle. Subsequently, participants were 
given ten solvable anagrams and were given two minutes to solve as many of them as 
possible. Results showed that following the unsolvable problem, those participants with a 
comparatively high level of superstitious beliefs solved more anagrams than those with a 
lower level of superstitious beliefs. Similar to Matute (1994), Dudley concluded that 
superstitions might help prevent the development of learned helplessness following instances 
of uncontrollability, which in turn prevents performance decline. However, both Matute’s 
and Dudley’s studies have limitations. For example, it has been claimed that superstitions 
that are experimentally induces are qualitatively different from more traditionally 
superstitions (Rudski, 2001). Basically, what is called a superstition in Matute’s study is the 
incorrect belief that a meaningless behavior (e.g. pressing a certain key combination) is 
responsible for the offset of loud tones. However, if participants are made to believe they 
have control over this unknown task, it is not surprising that their subsequent psychological 
state and performance in another task is not impaired in comparison to those participants 
whose key combination had a real effect on the tones. Moreover, the illusory belief 
developed in regard to the acoustic task and was not related whatsoever to the subsequent 
anagram task in which the “superstitious behavior” of pressing certain key combinations was 
not required. Traditional superstitions, however, usually are targeted on a specific task and 
are performed prior to that task. A fisherman exhibits superstitions in order to be fortunate in 
fishing. A student’s superstition is aimed at the exam. It is thus questionable whether the 
experimentally induced superstition in Matute’s study can actually be compared to 
traditional superstitious behavior. Similarly, in Dudley’s studies, the level of superstition that 
was assessed prior to and/or after the unsolvable word-puzzle task seems to have no specific 
relation to the subsequent anagram-task for which performance was assessed. Furthermore, 
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Dudley’s studies utilize a quasi-experimental design, which makes it difficult to distinguish 
the effects of superstitions from other personality variables.  
In sum, despite their limitations, the presented findings provide initial evidence for a 
causal relationship between superstition and performance. Specifically, these studies 
demonstrate that the adoption of superstitions in the face of uncontrollable achievement tasks 
prevent the impairment of task performance.  



Looking back at the laboratory studies in which superstitions were generated (Catania 
& Cutts, 1963; Keinan, 2002; Ono, 1987; Rudski et al., 1999; Van Raalte et al., 1991) it is 
interesting to note that most of them were conducted in a performance context. In the 
reinforcement studies as well as in the golf putting study, participants were prompted to try 
their best, however, without experiencing control of how to reach that goal. While all of 
these studies find that superstitions indeed develop under conditions of uncontrollability or 
among people with a strong desire for control, none of them included an objective 
performance measure subsequent to the emergence of the superstition. This seems to be a 
shortcoming, especially since many authors conclude by pointing out the importance of 
explicitly examining the influence of superstition on performance (Bleak & Frederick, 1998; 
Schippers & Van Lange, 2006; Van Raalte et al., 1991). Despite these reasonable arguments 
and manifold requests for further investigations, existing empirical evidence for a causal 
relationship between superstitions and superior performance is exceedingly small. The only 
exception is the series of studies that suggest that superstition may prevent the impairment of 
performance outcomes (Matute, 1994; Dudley, 1999). 
On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that most people report exhibiting 
superstitious behavior not only to prevent performance impairment but also to reach an 
actual performance improvement (Albas & Albas, 1989; Lobmeyer & Wasserman, 1986). 
Could it be that superstitions engaged in performance-related contexts do not only hinder the 
development of learned helplessness and thus performance impairment but moreover cause 
an increase in performance? In fact, several researchers have suggested such a beneficial 
function of superstition as an explanation for the high prevalence and maintenance of 
superstitions in sport and academics. The present research set out to fill the gap in empirical 
evidence supporting the notion that superstitions can indeed have an effect on performance 
outcome. The main purpose of the present research was to find an answer to the question of 
whether superstitious behaviors and beliefs indeed yield an advantage for those who hold 
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them. Specifically, the research was conducted to find empirical evidence for a causal 
relationship between superstition and superior performance.  

		
	
If the improvement of a performance indeed results from the presence of superstitious 
thoughts and behaviors prior to that task and thus may account for the high maintenance of 
superstitions in performance contexts, the inevitable question for the mediating process of 
this effect arises. What are the psychological mechanisms that might account for the 
potential effect of superstitions on subsequent performance enhancement?  
To answer this question it might be helpful to look at factors that are known to 
influence task performance in general. Next to general abilities and skills, which are among 
the most well-established influences on performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), a host of 
variables have been connected to performance outcomes in intellectual or athletic tasks. 
Many of them, such as motivational influences (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002), personality 
characteristics (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Day & Silverman, 1989; George, 1992), goal setting 
(Locke & Latham, 1990), prior experience (Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986; Seta & 
Hassan, 1980; Weekley & Ployhart, 2005), mood (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994), and 
emotions (Baron, 1990; Eysenck, 1985; Murray & Janelle, 2003) are factors within a person 
that have been shown to influence task performance. Other factors, such as the presence or 
absence of other people (Bond & Titus, 1983; Karau & Williams, 1993; Zajonc, 1965), noise 
(Glass & Singer, 1973; Nagar & Pandey, 1987), or time pressure (Freedman & Edwards, 
1988), for example, represent variables that may shape one’s environmental and situational 
conditions in the context of a performance task. However, one of the most important factors 
that has been proven to be a highly consistent predictor of performance outcomes is 
Bandura’s (1977, 1997, 2001) prominent concept of self-efficacy beliefs. In fact, many of the 
variables described above such as human motivation, goal setting, attribution styles, general 
well-being, affective processes, or prior experiences are actually influenced by people’s self-
efficacy beliefs themselves (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1989, 1994). Furthermore, the findings of 
numerous studies examining the relationship between self-efficacy beliefs and achievement 
outcomes leads to the conclusion that the contribution of self-efficacy oftentimes even 
overrides the effect of abilities and skills (Bouffard-Bouchard, 1990; Graham & Weiner, 
1996; Zimmerman & Cleary, 2006). Given the importance of Bandura’s (1997) self-efficacy 
concept concerning the prediction of performance outcomes, the concept as well as its 
contribution to performance outcomes will be described in more detail throughout the 
following paragraphs.  
 
$ &=
9	,		


	
			
Self-efficacy is the key concept in Bandura’s social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977, 
1986) and refers to one’s perceived capability to produce results and to attain designated 
types of performance (Bandura, 1977, 1997). In other words, self-efficacy judgments 
concern the confidence people have in their abilities to do the things they are trying to do 
(Pajares, 1996). According to Bandura, self-efficacy beliefs touch virtually every aspect of 
people’s lives. In fact, with regard to the role of self-efficacy beliefs in human functioning, 
Bandura (1997) states that “people’s level of motivation, affective states, and action are 
based more on what they believe than on what is objectively true” (p. 2). Therefore, the 
beliefs people hold about their capabilities can often be a better predictor of their behavioral 
outcomes than what they are actually capable of accomplishing. Indeed, abundant research 
within the last three decades provides empirical support for a powerful influence of self-
efficacy beliefs on various types of attainment (see Stajkovic & Luthand, 1998, for meta-
analysis of research on the relationship between self-efficacy beliefs and achievement 
outcomes). Thus, self-efficacy beliefs have been found to predict performance measures in 
many different areas, such as educational attainments (Schunk & Pajares, 2004), work-
related performance (Judge, Jackson, Shaw, Scott, & Rich, 2007), managerial performance 
(Gist, 1989; Wood, Bandura, & Bailey, 1990), social behavior (Gist, Stevens, & Bavetta, 
1991; Saks, 1995), cognitive and memory tasks (Bandura, Cioffi, Taylor, & Brouillard, 
1988; Berry, 1999; Berry & West, 1993), academic achievements (Bandura, 1997; Multon, 
Brown, & Lent, 1991), and athletic performance (Feltz & Chase, 1998; Moritz, Feltz, 
Fahrbach & Mack, 2000). Moreover, it has been revealed that self-efficacy is a more 
consistent predictor of behavioral outcomes than any other motivation construct (Graham & 
Weiner, 1996). Thus, efficacy beliefs contribute more strongly to future task performance 
than ability or past performance (Bandura, 1982, 1993; Cervone, Jiwani, & Wood, 1991). 
With these findings at hand, it is possible to derive the assumption that self-efficacy beliefs 
play a mediating role for the effect of superstition on superior performance. Indeed, this 
reasoning is reminiscent of the suggestions by Neil (1980) or Keinan (2002), who described 
the functioning of superstitions in a similar way. Given that superstitions are most likely to 
be engaged by athletes and students, the following paragraphs will shed a more detailed light 
on findings that demonstrate the effects of self-efficacy beliefs on performance in the athletic 
as well as the intellectual context. 
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Numerous findings in recent research indicate that perceived efficacy beliefs contribute 
independently to intellectual performance across different academic domains such as writing 
(Shell, Murphy, & Bruning, 1989; Zimmerman & Bandura, 1994), reading (Schunk, 2003; 
Schunk & Swartz, 1993), mathematics (Collins, 1982; Pajares & Miller, 1994), and problem 
solving (Bouffard-Bouchard, 1990). These studies repeatedly demonstrate that those who 
hold stronger efficacy beliefs have a higher probability of succeeding and mastering various 
intellectual activities better than those with weaker efficacy beliefs, even if the latter have the 
same inherent ability or skill level (Zimmerman & Cleary, 2006). Collins (1982), for 
example, selected students who judged themselves to be of high or low math self-efficacy 
within each of three levels of mathematical ability (high, intermediate, low). Participants 
were then asked to solve difficult mathematical problems that were presented to them. At 
each level of math ability, students who had the stronger belief in their efficacy solved more 
problems, were quicker to discard faulty strategies, and reworked more failed problems than 
did students of equal ability who were lower in their sense of self-efficacy. Similar results 
were presented by Bouffard-Bouchard (1990), who showed the causal contribution of 
efficacy beliefs to intellectual performance even more directly. Specifically, in this study, 
high or low efficacy beliefs were experimentally manipulated at two levels of ability on a 
novel problem-solving task. To do so, participants received arbitrary feedback about their 
performance as compared to fictitious peer norms. Regardless of students’ pretest level of 
ability, those whose sense of efficacy was raised were more successful in their problem 
solving and were more flexible in their strategic search for effective solutions than those 
students whose self-efficacy was lowered.  
A different approach that sheds further light on the direct effect of self-efficacy beliefs 
on intellectual performance stems from studies that include path analyses (Pajares & Miller, 
1994; Schunk, 1981, 1984; Zimmerman & Bandura, 1994). Pajares and Kranzler (1995), for 
example, examined the unique contribution made by efficacy beliefs to the prediction of 
mathematics achievements when a measure of general intelligence was included in the 
model. Next to mathematics self-efficacy and general mental ability, the path model also 
included math anxiety, high school math level, and gender. Results revealed that even when 
the effects of general mental ability were controlled, participants’ perceived math self-
efficacy accounted for unique variance in intellectual performance. In fact, self-efficacy and 
general cognitive ability on student’s math problem-solving achievement were about equally 
strong predictors of students’ math problem-solving achievement.  
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In sum, research has repeatedly demonstrated the unique predictive influence of self-
efficacy beliefs on intellectual performance. Independent of their general or task specific 
skills, people achieve higher intellectual performance when they experience a high level of 
self-efficacy rather than a low level.  
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Similar to the presented findings on intellectual achievements, many studies in the field 
of sports demonstrate the impact of perceived self-efficacy on athletic task performance (see 
Moritz et al., 2000, for a meta-analysis on the relationship between self-efficacy beliefs and 
athletic performance). Initial evidence for the positive relationship between perceived 
efficacy and athletic performance stems from the many correlational and regression studies 
in numerous fields of sport such as tennis (Barling & Abel, 1983), golf (Beauchamp, Bray, & 
Albinson, 2002; Bond, Biddle, & Ntoumanis, 2001), gymnastics (Lee, 1982; Weiss, Wiese, 
& Klint, 1989), springboard-diving (Feltz, Landers, & Raeder, 1979; Slobounov, Yukelson, 
& O’Brien, 1997), basketball (Kavussanu, Crews, & Gill, 1998), baseball (Watkins, Garcia, 
& Turek, 1994), hockey (Feltz & Lirgg, 1998), volleyball (Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 2002), 
wrestling (Treasure et al., 1996), and triathlon (Burke & Jin, 1996). Although most of these 
studies suggest that self-efficacy is the strongest or even the only factor that predicts athletic 
outcomes, the results should be interpreted carefully because they are correlational in nature. 
More direct evidence for the causal relationship between self-efficacy and athletic 
performance can be drawn from experimental studies in which the level of perceived 
efficacy was manipulated (Boyce & Bingham, 1997; Wells, Collins, & Hale, 1993) or from 
studies using path analyses (Feltz, Chow, & Hepler, 2006; Fitzsimmons, Landers, Thomas, 
& Van der Mars, 1991; George, 1994; Theodorakis, 1995). In particular, a series of 
experiments by Weinberg and his colleagues (Weinberg, 1985; Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 
1979; Weinberg, Gould, Yukelson, & Jackson, 1981; Weinberg, Yukelson, & Jackson, 1980) 
verifies Bandura’s (1977) claim that perceived self-efficacy independently contributes to the 
prediction of future athletic performance. To examine the effect of self-efficacy on muscular 
endurance performance, participants were randomly assigned to either a high or a low self-
efficacy condition (Weinberg, 1985; Weinberg et al., 1979; Weinberg et al., 1981). 
Specifically, participants in the high efficacy condition were led to believe that they were to 
perform against a person with weak ligaments and a knee injury who previously had 
performed poorly on a similar leg-strength task. Participants in the low efficacy condition 
thought that they were performing against a well-trained track athlete who ostensibly had 
outperformed participants in a previous leg strength-task. While all participants lost to the 
confederate in the experimental trials of the endurance task, participants of the high efficacy 
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group held their legs out longer than those in the low efficacy group (Weinberg, 1985; 
Weinberg et al., 1979). Additionally, compared to the first trial, high self-efficacious 
participants exhibited increased muscular endurance performance on the second trial, 
whereas those in the low self-efficacy group displayed lower performance times on the 
second trial (Weinberg et al., 1979). Moreover, Weinberg and colleagues (Weinberg et al., 
1981) examined the differential effects of preexisting self-efficacy beliefs and manipulated 
self-efficacy beliefs on muscular endurance performance. Results indicated that preexisting 
efficacy expectations primarily influenced endurance performance on the first trial. 
Experimentally manipulated self-efficacy beliefs, however, exerted greater influence on the 
performance times in the second trial.  
Taken together, the results of these studies provide strong evidence in support of a 
causal relationship between self-efficacy beliefs and performance in the athletic domain. 
Specifically, it has been repeatedly shown that individuals with a high sense of self-efficacy 
display higher athletic performance than individuals with a lower level of self-efficacy 
beliefs. Moreover, the contribution of experimentally manipulated task-specific efficacy 
expectations on the prediction of an athletic performance seems to override the influence of 
preexisting self-efficacy beliefs, at least under some conditions.  
In this regard, performance enhancement can be expected to be apparent whenever it is 
possible to raise people’s task-specific self-efficacy beliefs. Applying this idea to the topic of 
the present research, one can argue that the expected effect of superstition on superior 
performance may be mediated by self-efficacy beliefs. This should only be the case, 
however,  if the activation or execution of superstitions indeed leads to the presumed raise in 
perceived self-efficacy. A closer look on further aspects and dimensions of the concept of 
self-efficacy beliefs may shed light on this perspective.  
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According to Bandura (1977, 1997), self-efficacy beliefs vary across the three 
dimensions of level, strength, and generality. The level of self-efficacy refers to people’s 
expected performance attainments at different levels of difficulty, such as anagram problems 
of increasing difficulty. The strength of self-efficacy judgments refers to the certainty of 
people’s beliefs that they can attain these different levels of performance, ranging from 
complete uncertainty to complete certainty. Thus, two individuals may believe that they can 
solve the same amount of anagram tasks, however, one may be more certain about this belief 
than the other. The generality of self-efficacy beliefs refers to the transferability of one’s 
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efficacy judgments across different tasks or activities, such as different word tasks (Feltz, 
Short, & Sullivan, 2008).  
Instead of focusing on personality traits and psychological characteristics, self-efficacy 
beliefs refer to people’s perceived capabilities to perform specific activities (Zimmerman, 
1995). Thus, self-efficacy beliefs refer to beliefs about what people can do with their skills 
rather than what skills or attributes they have (Feltz et al., 2008; Zimmerman & Cleary; 
2006). Additionally, self-efficacy beliefs are specific to distinct domains. A student, for 
example, might feel efficacious in regard of academic activities but may lack confidence in 
parental tasks. Moreover, even within a particular domain, self-efficacy beliefs may vary 
depending on the context or the specific task. In terms of context-specificity, an athlete may 
express a higher sense of efficacy about performing a routine in a training session than in a 
public competition. Similarly, in terms of task-specificity, a student’s efficacy beliefs 
concerning academic activities may be low for problem solving tasks but high for writing 
activities or presentation tasks (Bandura, 1997; Cleary & Zimmerman, 2004). The specificity 
of the self-efficacy construct has important implications.  
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The first implication refers to the measurement of the construct. According to Bandura 
(1997, 2006), scales of perceived self-efficacy must be tailored to the particular domain of 
functioning one wishes to assess. Moreover, the degree of specificity at which self-efficacy 
is measured should be determined by the nature of the situation at hand and the nature of the 
situation or task to which one wishes to generalize or predict. A second implication refers to 
the context-specificity of self-efficacy beliefs. If people’s perceived self-efficacy depends on 
specific context features then it should be possible to shape people’s self-efficacy beliefs by 
varying the context. This is exactly what has been found. Throughout the extensive research 
on self-efficacy beliefs, manifold methods such as false feedback (Klein, Loftus, & Fricker, 
1994; Sanna, 1997; Weinberg et al., 1979), verbal messages (Wise & Trunnell, 2001), 
modeling (Lirgg & Feltz, 1991; Gould & Weiss, 1981), or manipulation of prior task 
difficulty and thus experience (Wells et al., 1993; Yan & Gill, 1984) have been used to 
influence participants’ perceived level of efficacy in experimental or applied settings. 
Furthermore, additional factors that have been found to affect self-efficacy are cognitive 
strategies such as self-talk (Vargas-Tonsing, Myers, & Feltz, 2004), emotional and 
physiological states (Chase, Feltz, & Lirgg, 2003; Maddux & Meier, 1995), imagined 
experiences (Maddux, 1995), and social support (Vealey, Hayashi, Garner-Holman, & 
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Giacobbi, 1998). From this perspective, it also seems possible that self-efficacy beliefs may 
increase in the context of activated or exhibited good luck superstitions compared to 
situations where superstitions are lacking. As Bandura (1997) notes, people can judge their 
degree of confidence by the emotional state they experience while preparing for an action. 
Thus, one way to enhance self-efficacy is to improve people’s physical and emotional well-
being. This mode of functioning might come into play when people engage in superstitious 
behavior prior to a performance task. From this perspective it seems reasonable that the mere 
activation of a superstition associated with the positive concept of good luck (Teigen, 1995, 
2005) in the context of a performance task may enhance people’s positive emotional 
reactions toward the designated task and thus may provide cues about the anticipated success 
or failure of the outcome. In fact, several non-empirical speculations as well as prior 
empirical findings on research examining psychological consequences of superstitious 
thoughts and actions support this reasoning.  
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As described earlier, superstitions are particularly likely to arise in situations of high 
psychological stress, perceived uncertainty and low controllability. Moreover, the prevalence 
and maintenance of superstitions seems to be especially high among students and athletes, 
who face performance situations containing these characteristics more often than other 
populations. With this in mind, it seems natural to conclude that superstitions actually help 
those who hold these beliefs to deal with pressure and to overcome mental and physical 
obstacles. Even though empirical research on beneficial functions of superstitions is scarce, 
several authors have suggested such a positive influence of superstitious beliefs on 
psychological well-being. Thus, it has been speculated that athletes use superstitions to 
reduce anxiety, build confidence, and cope with uncertainty (Dunleavy & Miracle, 1979; 
Neil, 1980; Neil et al., 1981; Womack, 1979). Schippers and Van Lange (2006) claimed that 
the benefit of superstitions might stem from reducing psychological tension in athletes, thus 
enhancing the probability of reaching the ideal performance state (IPS, Garfield & Bennet, 
1984; Williams, 1986). Becker (1975) noted, that athletes practice superstitions to “keep 
things constant and minimize disruption” (p. 151 f).  
In sum, all of these speculations are consistent with the notion that the execution of 
superstitions bears some kind of psychological benefit for the individual holding the 
superstition. In fact, some of these suggestions, such as an increased level of perceived 
confidence in a specific performance setting, seem to come rather close to the proposed 
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influence of superstitions on self-efficacy beliefs. Beside these unevaluated arguments, a 
small body of empirical findings provides further support for this perspective. 
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One line of empirical studies examining the potential effect of superstition on enhanced 
feelings of confidence stems from research on belief in good luck (Darke & Freedman, 
1997a, 1997b; Day & Maltby, 2003, 2005). As the attempt to control luck presumably is the 
purpose of most superstitions (Darke & Freedman, 1997a, Vyse, 1997), these findings 
clearly contribute to research on superstitions in general. While Darke and Freedman (1997a) 
developed a scale to measure the belief in good luck as a stable personality attribute, Day 
and Maltby (2003, 2005) demonstrated that this nevertheless irrational belief might be 
adaptive with respect to several psychological variables. Thus, they found that a belief in 
good luck is significantly related to optimism and shares a significant negative correlation 
with depression and anxiety (Day & Maltby, 2003), which together lead to greater 
psychological well-being (Scheier & Carver, 1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988). In a separate set 
of studies, the same authors demonstrated a positive relationship between belief in good luck 
and hope (Day & Maltby, 2005), and suggested that belief in good luck can be viewed as an 
important component in goal planning cognitions. Assuming that psychological variables 
such as optimism, hope, and reduced anxiety share several characteristics with the concept of 
self-efficacy, these findings can be viewed as the first support for the idea that superstitious 
beliefs are related to self-efficacy beliefs. However, the limitations of these studies clearly 
can be seen in their methodologies, as the observed correlations do not allow the 
interpretation of the results in a causal manner. Thus, it remains unclear whether 
superstitious behavior elicits hope, optimism, and psychological well-being or whether 
superstitions are the result of those psychological states. 
Using an experimental design, Darke and Freedman (1997b) examined the effects of 
believing in good luck on confidence and risk-taking in a future unrelated event, thus coming 
even closer to the concept of self-efficacy than previous studies. In this study, several weeks 
after participants’ belief in good luck was measured, participants either experienced a lucky 
event (winning $5 in an ostensible lottery) or no lucky event ($5 simply given to them, 
without winning the money) prior to a decision task. In this task, participants had to decide 
which of two stimuli that were flashed on the computer screen very briefly outnumbered the 
other one. Participants’ confidence as well as their risk-taking (i.e., betting real money on 
their decision) were assessed. Interestingly, after the lucky event, those who indicated a 
belief in luck rated their confidence higher and placed higher bets on their decisions, whereas 
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those who indicated they did not believe in luck rated their confidence lower and placed 
lower bets. The authors suggested that these findings indicate some support for the notion 
that belief in good luck can serve as a source of confidence for future events, thus exerting a 
beneficial functioning. However, similar to the studies presented above, this study also has 
some shortcomings regarding the possible interpretation of its results in terms of the 
superstitious benefits. First, while the lucky event was experimentally manipulated, the 
second variable – belief in good luck - was not. In this regard, the presented study is only a 
semi-experimental design, thus limiting the causal interpretation of the obtained results. 
Second, the manipulation of the lucky event might differ from superstitious behaviors in 
their traditional meaning. While the lucky event in this study was something that simply 
happened to the participants rather accidentally, superstitious behaviors usually are 
deliberately engaged by individuals who actively seek out luck. Furthermore, the lucky event 
in the present study was completely unrelated to the subsequent task. Typically, superstitions 
for good luck bear some relation to the situation in which they are exhibited in that the 
superstitious behavior is meant to help in this very same situation. Thus, a student, for 
example, may deliberately wear a lucky charm to an exam because she believes that this 
object might be helpful for exactly this exam. Despite these limitations and differences, the 
presented findings on the belief in good luck might contribute to a better understanding of 
superstitious consequences, and suggest that this irrational belief may serve the benefit of 
increasing feelings of confidence.  
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In another line of research, superstitious behavior has been related to the concept of the 
illusion of control (Langer, 1975). This term describes people’s erroneous belief that they 
can influence the outcomes of situations that are determined entirely by chance. In a series of 
experiments, Langer (1975) demonstrated that participants’ confidence increased when they 
were given the feeling that they had control over the outcome. To manipulate illusory 
control, features that were likely to improve performance in skill-related tasks were included 
in the chance-determined tasks. For instance, participants gave higher confidence ratings for 
a task with randomly distributed outcomes if they had been given the opportunity to practice, 
in comparison to those who received no practice at all. Another way rather than focusing on 
skill related aspects of the task in order to meet the strong desire for control over important 
events (Burger, 1986) might be to rely on irrational beliefs about luck (Darke & Freedman, 
1997a, 1997b). Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) suggested that people engage in 
irrational beliefs about luck to remain confident and optimistic in situations when it is 
difficult or impossible to control the outcome through direct action. This perspective is well 
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in line with earlier presented research demonstrating that people become more superstitious 
when they are exposed to seemingly uncontrollable threats (Keinan, 1994, 2002; 
Malinowski, 1954). Evidence pointing in the same direction stems from a study by Rudski 
(2004) who demonstrated that people exhibiting an illusion of control indicated greater 
levels of overall paranormal beliefs. This correlation was mainly based on the relation 
between the illusion of control and socially shared superstitions. However, from this 
correlative evidence it is impossible to conclude that an increased sense of control actually 
follows from acting on a superstition.  
Without a doubt, the clearest finding concerning the relationship between superstition 
and self-efficacy was reported in an additional study by Rudski (2001). In this reinforcement 
study, participants exhibited superstitious beliefs and behaviors concerning the activity and 
importance of lever presses in order to control the onset of a tone. Subsequently, 
participants’ perceived self-efficacy toward the experimental task was assessed by asking 
them about their belief in improved future performance. Rudski found that this measure was 
positively correlated with the degree of experimentally induced superstitious beliefs, and 
interpreted his findings as evidence for a positive correlation between superstition and self-
efficacy. However, Rudski concedes himself that the experimentally created superstitions 
should be differentiated from commonly held superstitions. While a lucky charm or crossed 
fingers do not contain a guidance on how to perform a task, the experimentally induced 
superstition reflects participants’ conviction that they had discovered the connection between 
their lever pressing and the tone. Thus, it is not too surprising that participants predicted 
improved performance on a second trial – now that they had figured out how the game 
worked.  
Further empirical evidence supporting an effect of superstition on enhanced efficacy or 
illusion of control can be drawn from the previously discussed work of Matute (1994) and 
Dudley (1999). However, while both authors concluded from their findings that the 
prevention of performance impairment in the presence of superstitious thoughts was based 
upon an illusion of control, only Matute actually presented empirical data supporting this 
reasoning. Specifically, she demonstrated that the tendency to develop superstitious behavior 
during the exposure to the uncontrollable noise provided an illusion of control as participants 
indicated no perception of uncontrollability.  
Taken together, several lines of reasoning as well as a few empirical findings provide 
evidence for a beneficial function of superstitions with regard to favorable psychological 
variables. Even though only one of these studies directly examined the effect of superstitious 
thoughts and behaviors on self-efficacy beliefs, many findings seem to point in this very 
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same direction. In combination, the suggested beneficial consequences of superstitions 
described above, such as increased optimism, enhanced confidence for a specific task, and 
feelings of control in given situations, indeed seem related to the prominent construct of self-
efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1977, 1997, 2001). Therefore, does it not seem very likely that 
people’s perceived level of self-efficacy subsequent to the execution or activation of a good 
luck-oriented superstition may serve as mediating factor for the predicted performance 
enhancement in this context? 
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

Expecting a causal effect of superstition on superior performance, it only seems natural 
to ask how this influence could come into existence. Researchers like Keinan (2002), for 
example, have speculated about the answer to this question and suggested a raised sense of 
confidence as a mediating factor. Indeed, the study of literature on performance influences 
reveals that one of the most contributing factors to performance outcome is the construct of 
perceived self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1986; 1997). Numerous findings demonstrate that 
people’s beliefs about their capabilities to attain required outcomes oftentimes are the most 
consistent predictors of achievements in academic and athletic settings. Specifically, 
regardless of their skills or knowledge, people who perceive a high level of preexisting or 
experimentally manipulated self-efficacy typically achieve higher task performance than 
those who perceive lower levels of efficacy expectations. Next to the repeatedly 
demonstrated strong causality of this effect, it is interesting to note that self-efficacy beliefs 
are subject to experimental manipulations. Specifically, these findings suggest that people’s 
self-efficacy beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors that yield information concerning their 
specific task abilities. This information may be drawn from feedback, social comparisons, or 
verbal persuasion (Bandura, 1997), but might just as well be retrieved from external help 
such as social supporters or exhibited superstitions. In fact, the latter assumption concerning 
an influence of superstitions on perceived efficacy beliefs finds initial support from several 
studies examining the consequences of superstition on psychological variables. Driven by 
the assumption that superstitions might serve beneficial functions by helping the individual 
to overcome mental obstacles in performance-related situations, several authors present 
results that point to an effect of superstition on people’s efficacy. For example, the 
superstitious belief in good luck has been demonstrated to relate to optimism, hope, and 
confidence. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the adoption of superstitions in the face 
of uncontrollability provides an illusion of control and leads to beliefs in improved future 
performance.  
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Assuming that activated superstitions indeed lead to performance enhancement, the 
second purpose of the present research was to describe its underlying mechanism. Which 
underlying process can account for the effect? To answer this question, the present line of 
research focused on the concept of self-efficacy beliefs. Combining the knowledge that self-
efficacy exerts one of the most important influences on task performance with the presented 
idea self-efficacy may be enhanced in the presence of superstitions, the present research was 
designed to examine whether the predicted effect of superstition on superior performance is 
indeed mediated by self-efficacy beliefs.  
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Inspection of existing research on superstitions revealed that, despite their seeming 
irrationality, superstitious beliefs and behaviors are very common. This is especially true in 
situations characterized by high stress, perceived uncertainty, and unpredictable outcomes. 
Interestingly, superstitious beliefs especially abound in the world of sports as well as 
academia. At a closer look, however, it becomes apparent that both athletes and students 
regularly engage in performance-related tasks such as competitions or exams. In fact, these 
events share many characteristics with situations that have been shown to elicit superstitions. 
These findings at hand, some researchers started to speculate about potential beneficial 
functions of superstitious behaviors. Clearly, the most influential benefit of superstitions for 
people in an achievement setting would be a direct effect of the exhibited superstition on 
their performance. Such an influence of superstition on performance could not only explain 
the high prevalence of superstitious thoughts and behaviors among athletes and students but 
also their continuous maintenance. Despite the plausibility of this perspective, the 
empirically conducted research concerning the effects of superstition on performance is 
exceedingly small. Existing findings, however, do support the notion of a superstition-
performance link by demonstrating that performance impairment can be prevented by 
superstitions. Support for an actual performance enhancement through superstition, however, 
has not yet been demonstrated. Even if such an effect seems plausible, the question one 
might ask, of course, is how this influence could be explained. Studying the extensive 
literature on performance influences in general, it becomes apparent that one of the most 
influential factors affecting task performance is self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997). 
Abundant research on this concept, which refers to people’s perceived confidence to 
master an activity, confirms that efficacy expectations importantly contribute to the 
prediction of performance. Thus, in intellectual as well as in athletic settings, high self-
efficacy beliefs lead to better performance than low perceived self-efficacy. However, if self-
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efficacy beliefs should account for the underlying mechanism of superstition on superior 
performance, self-efficacy must not only influence performance but must be influenced by 
superstitions itself. As self-efficacy is a context-specific construct, it has repeatedly been 
demonstrated that people’s perceived self-efficacy toward a task indeed can be raised or 
lowered by varying the context. Furthermore, several researchers have speculated that such a 
change in self-efficacy could also be the result of executed superstitions prior to a 
performance task. Indeed, research on psychological consequences of superstitions suggests 
several beneficial psychological functions of superstitions that point in the very same 
direction. Thus, it has been demonstrated that superstitions are related to enhanced feelings 
of optimism, hope, and confidence, as well as feelings of control.  
Together, the outlined theoretical perspectives as well as the demonstrated lack of 
empirical findings on these important questions inspired the present line of research. 
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According to natural and evolutionary plausibility, behaviors that are maintained over a 
long period of time and exhibited in particularly difficult situations are thought to yield a 
specific beneficial function. The subjects of the present work are superstitious behaviors and 
thoughts that seem to arise in important performance settings. 
The present research was designed to provide empirical support for two particular 
claims. First, I aimed to find empirical evidence of a causal relationship between superstition 
and superior performance in both motor and cognitive tasks. The second purpose of this 
research was to describe the mediating mechanism for such a superstition-performance link. 
Specifically, I attempted to verify the claim that increased self-efficacy beliefs as 
consequences of the activation of a superstition mediate the effect of superstition on 
performance enhancement.  
Study 1 was conducted to explore the prevalence of several superstitious beliefs within 
the present population. Specifically, the aim was to get a sense as to how widespread 
superstitions are among students of the University of Cologne and also to detect specific 
superstitions that are shared by many students and thus could be used for later experiments. 
Studies 2 through 4 were designed to demonstrate a causal effect between the 
implementation of a superstition and the outcome of a performance task. In contrast to 
previous studies that attempted to examine the consequences of superstitions, a new 
methodological approach was applied in the present studies. Instead of measuring a 
superstitious trait, as had been done by Dudley (1999) and Rudski (2004), for example, or 
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having participants learn a new superstition in the laboratory (Matute, 1994, 1995), the 
present experimental designs used specific superstitious beliefs that are widely shared by the 
participating students. Based on the results of Study 1, I activated the most prominent 
superstitions within the present population prior to a performance task. Subsequently, 
performance was measured. In the course of these studies, both the method of superstition 
activation and the performance measure varied. Specifically, in Studies 2 and 3, the widely 
believed superstitious concepts of good and bad luck were linked to the equipment 
participants used while engaging in the performance task. That is, participants had to 
perform a golf-putting task using either an ostensibly “lucky ball” or an ostensibly “unlucky 
ball.” As an index of performance, the number of successful putts was assessed. As an 
extension of Study 2, a neutral condition in which the status of the ball was not mentioned 
was included in the experimental design of Study 3 to explore the direction of the 
superstitious influence on performance. In Study 4, participants’ performance in a motor 
dexterity task was assessed after the experimenter applied either the good luck-related and 
commonly known superstition of keeping one’s fingers crossed or an equivalent but non-
superstitious saying prior to the task.  
Studies 5 and 6 were designed to replicate the findings of the former studies and to shed 
light on the presumed underlying process. Here, I examined whether self-efficacy judgments 
are indeed higher after the implementation of a good luck-related superstition in comparison 
to either a bad luck-related superstition or the withdrawal of the positive superstition. 
Therefore, the design of both studies included several judgments of participants’ perceived 
task-specific self-efficacy, which were assessed in between the superstition manipulation and 
the performance measure. In Study 5, the superstitious concepts of good versus bad luck 
were presented outside of participant’s conscious awareness by using a subliminal priming 
method and performance was measured in a Tetris-game. For participants in Study 6, a 
personal lucky charm was either present or absent while engaging in a memory task. For 
both of the studies, mediation analyses were conducted to examine whether changes in self-
efficacy judgments indeed mediate the effect of superstition on performance.  
Across Studies 2 through 6, I used multiple methods to implement a superstition in an 
attempt to extend the degree to which the results can be generalized to a variety of different 
superstitions. Furthermore, knowing that superstitions are most likely to occur among 
athletes and students, the present studies were designed to ensure the applicability of their 
results to both motor and cognitive tasks.  
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The purpose of the first study was to explore the prevalence of several superstitious 
beliefs within a particular population. Specifically, I aimed to get a general overview 
whether University students exhibit superstitions as frequently as reported in former studies 
(Albas & Albas, 1989; Gallagher & Lewis, 2001). I also wished to detect specific 
superstitious thoughts and practices that are shared by many students and thus could be used 
for later experiments. Therefore, I constructed a questionnaire on superstitious beliefs and 
administered it to students of the University of Cologne.  
)
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Participants.173 undergraduate students at the University of Cologne majoring in 
different educational disciplines were asked to participate in the study. The study took place 
during their introduction to social psychology class. The mean age of participants was 24 
years and about 93 percent of all participants indicated German as their mother tongue. 
Participants were offered a chocolate bar as compensation. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants were handed a pack of paper and pencil materials 
containing several unrelated studies on different topics including the explorative superstition 
questionnaire, which was positioned as second study within the stack. On the first page of 
the questionnaire, participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to assess the 
prevalence of superstitions, situations in which superstition occurs, and specific forms of 
superstitious practices that are common among students. To minimize participants’ feelings 
of embarrassment or fear of negative evaluation, which has often been reported in research 
on superstition (Van Raalte et al., 1991; Vyse, 1997), participants were given several 
examples of well known persons in the world of sport who reportedly exhibited superstitious 
practices. Moreover, it was emphasized that all data would be analyzed in an anonymous 
manner. The next three pages contained 20 questions concerning participants’ superstitions. 
First, they were asked to rate on a 9-point scale how superstitious they would consider 
themselves to be (1 = “not at all superstitious”; 9 = “very superstitious”). They were then 
asked to name those superstitious practices that they know from their daily life and to depict 
specific situations in which these practices occur. Next, participants had to rate on another 9-
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point scale the believed effectiveness of the named superstitious behaviors (1 = “not at all 
effective”; 9 = “very effective”). After describing potential mechanisms of these 
superstitious practices, consequences in cases where the superstition could not be performed, 
and the development of the superstitions, participants were asked to indicate on 9-point 
scales for several specific superstitious behaviors to what extent they believed in their 
effectiveness (1 = “not at all”; 9 = “very much”). Among others, these specific superstitions 
included practices like keeping one’s fingers crossed, carrying a lucky charm, breaking a 
mirror, and knocking on wood. Finally, participants were asked to indicate whether they 
considered a specific day as their lucky day or a specific number as their lucky number. At 
the very end of the packet of all studies, a questionnaire was included asking for participants’ 
sex, age, field of study, current semester, and native language. Finally, participants were 
thanked for their participation and given their compensation.  
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The data were analyzed in a descriptive manner to obtain some first impressions 
concerning the extent of superstitious behavior within this student population. That is, for all 
9-point scale judgments the mean and standard deviation was calculated. Furthermore, the 
frequency of entries was indicated by creating three categories: Ratings at the lower end of 
the 9-point scale (1-3) were integrated into the category “not at all/somewhat” (e.g. not at all 
superstitious/somewhat superstitious). Ratings at the middle part of the 9-point scale (4-6) 
were integrated into the category “moderate” (e.g. moderate superstitious). Finally, ratings at 
the upper end of the 9-point scale (7-9) were integrated into the category “fairly/very much” 
(e.g. fairly superstitious/very superstitious). For judgments in an open response format 
frequencies of entries were calculated allowing multiple responses.  
The detailed results are depicted in Tables 1-5 (see Appendix A2). As depicted in Table 
1, the prevalence of superstitions within undergraduate students of the University of Cologne 
is comparable to reports of other student populations (Albas & Albas, 1989), thus indicating 
a widespread existence of superstitious behaviors. Specifically, about 47 percent of all 
participants reported being at least moderately superstitious and 58 percent rated the 
effectiveness of their practiced superstitions at least on a moderate level. Inspection of Table 
2 reveals the same bias as reported in former studies (Abercrombie et al., 1970) in that the 
number of people listing at least one specific superstitious behavior they enact (n = 157) by 
far surpasses the number of people who admit being at least moderately superstitious (n = 
82). Taken together, the 173 participants named 319 superstitions (allowing for repeated 
response) that they know from their daily life. Moreover, these open responses concerning 
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participants’ specific superstitions reveal that wearing lucky charms and knocking on wood 
are the most frequently observed superstitions within the current population. When asked for 
specific situations in which the named superstitions occur, verbal exams or written tests 
clearly are the most frequent answer (n = 101), (see Table 3). Participants also reported 
exhibiting superstitious behavior in the context of athletic competitions or public 
performance (n = 26), while traveling or in the car (n = 12), in severe or important situations 
(n = 28), or in everyday life in general (n = 33). Table 4a depicts participants’ ratings 
concerning the effectiveness of several specific superstitions ordered by the amount of 
people who rated them at least moderately effective. As demonstrated, only 15 percent of the 
participants report believing not at all or only somewhat in the concepts of good luck and 
bad luck. In contrast, 36 percent report believing in these superstitious concepts on a 
moderate level, and almost half of the participants (48.8%) even rated their belief as fairly 
strong. More than 60 percent of the students rated both the superstition keeping one’s fingers 
crossed and wearing a lucky charm as at least moderately helpful. Inspection of Table 4b 
reveals that more participants report the existence of a personal lucky number (n = 71) than a 
specific lucky day (n = 21). Moreover, when asked about the underlying mechanism for the 
supposed effectiveness of superstitions, most participants indicated that the superstitious 
practice would yield a feeling of security, confidence, and reassurance (see Table 5a). 
Conversely, a superstition that for some reason could not be performed was thought to yield 
feelings of insecurity, concern, and anxiety (see Table 5b). 
In sum, the present findings clearly support the expectation that superstitions are 
frequently practiced among students at the University of Cologne and that these superstitions 
are thought to be effective in terms of “helping in important situations.” The most frequently 
observed superstitions were the general belief in the concepts of good and bad luck, keeping 
one’s fingers crossed, and carrying a lucky charm. Based on these results, I decided to work 
with exactly these most popular superstitions in the following studies. Specifically, for each 
study, the activation of one of the superstitions was manipulated using various methods. 
Subsequently, participants’ performance and related judgments were assessed.  
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In this study, I selected the most frequently observed superstition among the students of 
the University of Cologne - the general belief in the concepts of good or bad luck. I aimed to 
examine whether the activation of this superstition prior to a performance task would 
influence the outcome of this task. Specifically, inspired by studies on stereotype threat 
(Beilock, Jellison, Rydell, McConnell, & Carr, 2006) and the phenomenon of choking under 
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pressure (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008), participants were asked to 
engage in a golf-putting task in order to assess their motor performance. Prior to the putting 
task, the superstitious concepts of good versus bad luck were activated by linking them to the 
ball participants used. In other words, half of the participants were led to think of the ball as 
a “lucky ball,” whereas the other half thought of it as an “unlucky ball.” Research in the field 
(Albas & Albas, 1979; Becker, 1975; Gregory & Petrie, 1975) as well as in the laboratory 
(Van Raalte, et al., 1991) has shown that applying the concepts of good or bad luck to 
equipment like a racket or a ball is a kind of superstition that oftentimes occurs naturally, but 
can also be generated in a controlled setting. Applying the findings of Van Raalte and 
colleagues (1991), in the present study a ball was labeled “lucky ball” if a demonstration putt 
with that ball was successful. A ball was labeled “unlucky ball,” however, if a demonstration 
putt with that ball was unsuccessful. The number of successful putts in the putting task was 
taken as an index of motor performance. Participants for whom the concept of good luck was 
activated were expected to outperform those for whom the concept of bad luck was 
activated.  
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Participants. 26 female and male undergraduates of the University of Cologne were 
recruited as participants and were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. 
They were contacted at the university cafeteria and asked to participate in a short study that 
would last about ten minutes. Participants were offered a chocolate bar as compensation.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were run individually by a female experimenter 
who was the same for all participants. Upon agreeing to take part in the study, participants 
were led to the laboratory and greeted by the experimenter. Participants were informed that 
they were about to take part in a study on fine motor skills. Therefore, they were asked to 
perform a golf-putting task. All participants performed the same putting task on the carpeted 
ground of the laboratory using a standard golf putter, a ball, and a horseshoe-like target 
serving as the hole. At a distance of 100 cm from the target, a green cross on the floor 
indicated the location from which participants were to take their putts. Before participants 
started with the putting task, however, the experimenter demonstrated how to perform the 
putt. Specifically, she demonstrated the technically correct position of the legs, the hands, 
and with how much force to hit the ball. Most important, however, was the outcome of this 
demonstration. For one half of the participants, the experimenter successfully completed the 
demonstration by putting the ball into the horseshoe-shaped hole. For the other half, the 
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experimenter failed by missing the target1. In both cases, the experimenter commented the 
outcome of her demonstration, thereby manipulating the independent variable. Specifically, 
each hit was accompanied by the experimenter’s comment: “Oh, this seems to be a lucky 
ball (Glücksball).” Each miss, on the other hand, was followed by the statement: “Oh, this 
seems to be an unlucky ball (Pechball).” Subsequently, the ball was handed over to the 
participants who were instructed to perform 10 putts as accurately as possible. For each putt, 
the experimenter recorded whether the putt was successful or missed the hole. After the final 
putt, participants’ judgments concerning their perceived performance, as well as their mood, 
their nervousness, and their calmness at the time of the putting task were assessed for 
explorative purposes on a 9-point rating scale ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 9 (“very 
much”) at the computer. Finally, some self-descriptive information, including participants’ 
sex, age, field of study, and current semester was assessed before participants were thanked 
for their participation and offered their compensation.  
In sum, Study 2 is based on a single factor design consisting of two conditions (“lucky 
ball” vs. “unlucky ball”).  
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The central dependent measure in this study is the number of successful putts 
participants achieved in the putting task.  
As expected, inspection of Figure 1 reveals that the performance in the putting task 
indeed depends on whether a superstition associated with good luck or a superstition 
associated with bad luck had been activated beforehand. Specifically, participants 
performing the putting task with a ball that had been labeled a “lucky ball” hit the hole more 
often (M = 5.85) than participants who performed the task with an “unlucky ball” (M = 
4.08), t(24) = 2.40, p < .03. Interestingly, participants themselves did not notice this 
difference in performance. More specifically, performance judgments in the “lucky ball” 
condition (M = 6.15) did not differ from the judgments in the “unlucky ball” condition (M = 
6.0), t < 1, ns. The same is true for mood judgments (“lucky ball”: M = 7.15; “unlucky ball”: 
M = 6.85), for judgments of participants’ nervousness (“lucky ball”: M = 3.31; “unlucky 
ball”: M = 2.77), as well as for their calmness (“lucky ball”: M = 6.23; “unlucky ball”: M = 
6.15), all t < 1, ns. 
                                                     
1
 The experimenter was well practiced in the putting task, achieving a hit rate of approximately 
90 percent, thus allowing for a reliable random assignment of participants into the experimental 
conditions. 
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Figure 1. Mean number of successful hits in the putting task for “lucky ball” vs. 
“unlucky ball” manipulation. Error bars represent one standard error from the mean. 
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The obtained effect is consistent with the prediction that the activation of a superstition 
prior to a performance task indeed affects the outcome of this task. As hypothesized, 
participants were more often successful in a putting task if prior to the task a superstition 
associated with good luck rather than bad luck was activated. Thus, performing with a 
“lucky ball” let to more hits than performing with an “unlucky ball”.  
One alternative explanation for the effect found in the present study concerns the 
possibility that it derives not from the ball’s label (“lucky” vs. “unlucky”), but rather depicts 
an observational learning effect (Bandura, 1977; 2006). Many behaviors and new motor 
skills in particular are likely to be learned by observing and imitating a model demonstrating 
that skill (Bandura, 1977; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Scully & Newell, 1985). For outcome-
oriented tasks such as the putting task in Study 2, it has been suggested, specifically, that the 
demonstrated end-goal of the task (e.g. hitting the ball in the hole) instead of the observed 
movement pattern is imitated (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Hayes, Ashford, & 
Bennett, 2007; Hodges, Hayes, Breslin, & Williams, 2005). Thus, it seems possible that 
engaging in the putting task after the observation of a successful model enhances 
performance compared to an observation of an unsuccessful model. In the present study, it 
remains unclear whether the manipulation of the superstition or the concomitant 
manipulation of the experimenter’s performance is responsible for the obtained results. 
Study 3 was conducted to address this shortcoming.  
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The general design of Study 3 was similar to that of the previous study, except for two 
changes. Again, participants had to engage in a 10-trial golf-putting task in which their  
performance was measured. Prior to the task, the superstitious concepts of good versus bad 
luck were activated by linking them to the ball participants used. The aim of Study 3 was to 
replicate the finding of Study 2 while ruling out the alternative explanation of the modeling 
effect. Therefore, the manipulation of the superstitious concepts was altered such that only 
the superstition but not the model of success or failure could account for subsequent 
differences in the performance task. This was achieved by eliminating the demonstration of a 
successful versus an unsuccessful putt, and solely focusing on the verbal manipulation.  
The second modification of the experimental design compared to Study 2 concerns the 
addition of a third condition serving as a neutral control condition. The purpose of this 
control condition, in which no superstitious concept was activated prior to the putting task, 
was to get at the question of which of the two opposing superstitious concepts drives the 
effect on performance. Specifically, performance enhancement in the context of a good luck-
superstition, performance impairment in the context of a bad luck-superstition, as well as the 
simultaneous influence of both superstitions on performance seemed to be possible 
hypotheses that were tested in Study 3. 
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Participants. 42 students of the University of Cologne were recruited as participants and 
were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. As in the previous study, 
they were contacted at the university cafeteria and asked to participate in a short study that 
would last about ten minutes. Participants were offered a chocolate bar as compensation.  
Materials and Procedure. The general procedure was very similar to that of Study 2. 
Again, participants were run individually by the experimenter who informed them that they 
would engage in a ten trial putting task as part of a study on psychomotor skills. However, in 
contrast to the previous study, the experimenter did not demonstrate the putting task but 
simply handed the ball over to the participants. In order to activate the concept of good luck, 
to about one third of the participants the experimenter announced: “Here is your ball. So far 
it had turned out as a lucky ball.” For another third of the participants, the concept of bad 
luck was activated by exchanging the label “lucky ball” for the label “unlucky ball.” In the 
third condition, which served as the control condition, no superstitious concept was activated 
at all. Here, the experimenter handed the ball over to the participants, saying: “Here is your 
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ball. So far, everyone has used this one.” Subsequently, participants performed the required 
10 putts from the same distance as in the previous study (100 cm) while the experimenter 
recorded the result for every trial. Finally, participants answered some demographic 
questions at the computer including their sex, age, field of study, and current semester. Upon 
completion, participants were thanked and offered their compensation. 
In sum, Study 3 is based on a single-factor design consisting of three conditions (“lucky 
ball” vs. “unlucky ball” vs. control).  
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Again, the number of trials in which participants successfully putted the ball into the 
hole served as the dependent measure. Thus, a higher score indicates a better performance in 
the required motor task.  
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Figure 2. Mean number of successful hits in the putting task for “lucky ball” vs. control 
condition vs. “unlucky ball.” Error bars represent one standard error from the mean. 
As predicted, inspection of Figure 2 reveals that the performance in the putting task 
indeed depends on which superstitious concept had been activated prior to the task. Using 
participants’ performance index as dependent measure, a single factor ANOVA revealed that 
performance differed depending on the experimental condition, F(2, 39) = 3.34, p < .05. 
More specifically, planned contrasts between conditions revealed that participants hit the ball 
into the hole more often if they had engaged in the putting task with a “lucky ball” (M = 
6.42) rather with an “unlucky ball” (M = 4.79), t(39) = 2.22, p < .04. Participants putting 
with a “lucky ball” also successfully completed a putt more often than participants in the 
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control condition (M = 4.75), t(39) = 2.34, p < .03. However, the performance of participants 
in the “unlucky ball” condition did not differ from the performance of participants in the 
control condition, t < 1, ns. 
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The present findings demonstrate that the outcome of a performance task indeed is 
influenced by the prior activation of a superstitious concept. In line with the presented 
hypothesis, the activation of a superstition associated with the concept of “good luck” prior 
to the motor task leads to a better performance than the activation of a superstition associated 
with the concept of “bad luck.” Thus, the obtained effect replicates the finding of Study 2 
while ruling out the alternative explanation of the modeling effect. Because in the present 
study the experimenter did not demonstrate the task and therefore did not serve as a model of 
success or failure for the participants, imitation of or assimilation to such a model cannot be 
responsible for the obtained differences in performance.  
The present findings also help to answer the question of whether both kinds of 
superstitious concepts (“good luck” vs. “bad luck”) equally strong affect performance or 
whether the impact of just one accounts for the obtained results. The findings clearly support 
the notion that the difference in performance results from an increase in performance 
subsequent to the activation of the “good luck” superstition compared to a neutral condition, 
but not from a decrease in performance subsequent to the activation of a “bad luck” 
superstition. Specifically, the number of hits in the putting task increased if participants had 
been given a “lucky ball” compared to the control condition in which participants had been 
given a ball “everyone had been playing with.” However, the number of hits in the putting 
task did not differ from the baseline (control condition) if participants were given an 
“unlucky ball”. Thus, it seems that superstitions associated with “good luck” are more 
effective than superstitions associated with “bad luck,” at least in a performance context. In 
fact, this finding may explain previous results (Albas & Albas, 1989; Wiseman and Watt, 
2004) demonstrating that in general good luck superstitions are more common than bad luck 
superstitions. 
Taken together, Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that activating a superstition prior to a 
motor task affects how well people perform in that task. Specifically, activating the concept 
of “good luck” increases performance compared to situations in which no superstition or the 
superstitious concept of “bad luck” has been activated.  
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In both Studies 2 and 3, I manipulated the activation of a superstition by linking the 
concepts of good versus bad luck to the equipment participants used while engaging in the 
performance task. Further, in both studies, participants’ performance was assessed via a 
motor task related to the field of sports, namely a golf-putting task. The aim of Study 4 was 
to replicate and, more importantly, to generalize the previous findings. Therefore, I altered 
the activated superstition as well as the performance task from that of Studies 2 and 3. 
Specifically, in order to assess performance, a motor dexterity game was used. Furthermore, 
I used the very specific superstitious behavior of “keeping one’s fingers crossed” to 
manipulate the activation of a superstition prior to the motor skill task. Both previous 
research (Rudski, 2003) and Study 1 of the present research indicated that “keeping one’s 
fingers crossed” is one of the most commonly known and practiced superstitious acts, with 
the purpose of wishing another person “good luck” for an upcoming task or situation. Thus, 
it is clearly associated with the concept of “good luck.” In the experimental condition of the 
present study, the experimenter activated this good luck superstition by saying it aloud and 
making the gesture as a starting signal for the motor skill task. In the neutral control 
condition, a common starting signal with no superstitious connotation was given to the 
participants. In order to control for a similar amount of encouragement between conditions 
and to demonstrate the specificity of the activated superstition a third condition was 
included. Here, the phrasing of the starting signal was identical to that in the experimental 
condition apart from one word, thus losing its superstitious meaning but sounding equally 
encouraging. Participants for whom the superstition associated with the concept of “good 
luck” was activated prior to the motor skill task were expected to outperform participants in 
both control conditions.  
)
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Participants. 51 female undergraduates of the University of Cologne were recruited as 
participants and randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. They were 
approached on the University campus and asked to participate in a short study on 
psychomotor skills for which they would receive candy as compensation.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were run individually by a female experimenter 
who was the same for all participants. Upon agreement to take part in the study, participants 
were informed that they would engage in a motor dexterity task and then fill in a short 
questionnaire. The experimenter then explained the motor skill task in more detail. The task 
was performed with a transparent plastic cube (about 4 x 4 x 4 cm). Diagonally within the 
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cube was a fixed slab containing 36 little holes. Also within the cube were 36 little balls. The 
task for participants was to place each ball into one of these holes by carefully tilting the 
cube in different directions. The task was accomplished when all of the balls had made their 
way into the holes. Participants were instructed to complete the task as quickly as possible. If 
no questions remained, the experimenter handed the cube over to the participants and gave a 
starting signal. In doing so, the experimenter also manipulated the experimental conditions. 
For about one third of the participants, for whom the “good luck” superstition was activated, 
the experimenter said “Ich drück dir die Daumen” and made this gesture in order to signal 
the participants to start the task. The verbatim translation of this expression is “I press my 
thumbs for you” and it is the German equivalent to the English saying, “I keep my fingers 
crossed for you.” For another third of the participants, the ordinary starting signal “Auf los 
gehts los”(“On Go you go”) was used by the experimenter, which did not activate a 
superstitious concept at all. For the remaining participants, the experimenter used the same 
phrasing as in the experimental condition, except for altering one word. Here, instead of 
saying “Ich drück dir die Daumen,” she said, “Ich drück dir die Uhr” (“I press the watch for 
you”), which was similarly encouraging but lost its superstitious meaning.  
While participants worked on the motor dexterity task, the experimenter kept quiet in 
the background, avoiding any conversation with the participants. The time participants 
needed to accomplish the task was recorded using a stopwatch. Subsequent to the 
performance task, participants were handed a folder containing a short questionnaire. On 9-
point scales, participants were asked to judge their performance in the dexterity task, their 
well-being during the task (1 = “not good at all”; 9 = “very good”), and how important they 
believed it was to finish the task as quickly as possible (1 = “not important at all”; 9 = “very 
important”). The last three questions concerned participants’ demographics, including their 
age, their occupation or field of study, and their mother tongue. Upon completion, 
participants were thanked and offered their compensation. 
In sum, Study 4 is based on a single-factor design consisting of three conditions 
(“fingers crossed” vs. “watch pressed” vs. control).  
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The time participants needed to accomplish the fine motor skill task reflects their 
performance und thus served as the main dependent measure.  
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Figure 3. Time needed to complete the motor dexterity task for “fingers crossed” vs. 
“watch pressed” vs. control condition. Error bars represent one standard error from the 
mean. 
Consistent with expectations, inspection of Figure 3 reveals that the performance in the 
motor dexterity task indeed depends on whether a specific superstition had been activated 
prior to the task. Using the time participants needed to complete the task as the dependent 
measure, a single factor ANOVA revealed that performance differed depending on the 
experimental condition, F(2, 48) = 3.16, p < .05. More specifically, planned contrasts 
between conditions revealed that participants accomplished the task faster if the 
experimenter had engaged in the “good luck” associated superstition of “keeping one’s 
fingers crossed” (M = 191,5 sec) rather than the ordinary starting signal (M = 342.3 sec), 
t(48) = 2.36, p < .03. Participants in the “fingers crossed” condition also finished the motor 
task faster than participants for whom the superstitious meaning of the phrasing was taken 
away (“watch pressed”), (M = 319.7 sec), t(48) = 2.0, p < .05. However, performance of 
participants in the “watch pressed” condition did not differ from the performance of 
participants in the control condition, t < 1, ns. 
Participants’ judgments concerning the importance of finishing the task as quickly as 
possible also depended on whether the superstitious concept was activated prior to the task. 
Using this judgment as dependent measure, a single factor ANOVA reveals a significant 
difference between experimental conditions, F(2, 48) = 4.39, p < .02. More specifically, 
planned contrasts between conditions reveal that the task was more important to participants 
for whom the experimenter kept her fingers crossed (M = 6.73) rather than for those who 
heard the ordinary starting sign (control) (M = 4.94), t(48) = 2.83, p < .01. Consistent with 
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prior expectations, participants in the “watch pressed” condition also subjectively perceived 
the task as more important (M = 6.22) than participants in the neutral control condition, t(48) 
= 2.12, p < .04. However, perceived importance of participants in the “fingers crossed” 
condition did not differ from performance of participants in the “watch pressed” condition, t 
< 1, ns. Participants’ judgments concerning their perceived performance as well as their 
well-being during the task did not depend on whether the superstitious concept had been 
activated prior to the task, all F < 1, ns. 

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The present findings replicate the effects of the earlier studies and demonstrate, again, 
that activating a superstition prior to a performance task influences the outcome of that task. 
Moreover, the present findings extend the effect to a different superstition as well as to a 
different performance task compared to those of Studies 2 and 3. Specifically, instead of 
linking the concept of “good luck” to an object, here engaging in the commonly known 
superstitious act of “keeping one’s fingers crossed” let to superior performance. The task 
with which performance was assessed changed from a golf-putting task in Studies 2 and 3 to 
a dexterity game involving fine motor skills. Thus, the findings of Study 4 show that the 
effect can be generalized to different situations.  
One might argue that the increased performance in the experimental condition is not a 
result of the activated superstition per se, but stems from a different level of encouragement 
by the experimenter. It seems possible that someone saying, “I keep my fingers crossed for 
you” sounds more personal or more encouraging, and thus makes the task at hand appear 
more important than when someone simply gives a “go” starting sigal. Indeed, the present 
data suggest, that it felt more important to finish the task as quickly as possible when the 
experimenter kept her fingers crossed rather than when she simply said, “go.” However, this 
was not true in the additional control condition. The starting signal, “I press the watch for 
you,” seems to be just as personal and encouraging as a good performance was just as 
important for these participants as for those in the experimental superstitious condition. 
Nevertheless, an effect on performance was found exclusively in the experimental condition 
in which the specific good luck-associated superstition of “keeping one’s fingers crossed” 
was activated before the task. This finding rules out the alternative explanation that the 
demonstrated effect is based on different levels of subjectively experienced importance, but 
rather demonstrates the specificity of the superstitious influence.  
In sum, Studies 2 through 4 repeatedly demonstrate that the outcome of a performance 
task can be influenced by a superstition that has been activated prior to that task, while using 
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different methods to manipulate the superstition and different tasks to assess the 
performance. The results of Study 3 indicate that it is a superstition associated with the 
concept of “good luck,” specifically, that has the effect of increasing a subsequent 
performance. Furthermore, the findings of Study 4 suggest that the reported performance 
enhancement cannot simply be explained by a difference in the perceived importance of 
performing the task well. Although, these studies consistently support the hypothesis, all 
three studies used a motor task. In real life, however, people also oftentimes engage in 
superstitious acts or thoughts in the context of cognitive tasks such as important exams 
(Albas & Albas, 1989). Therefore, in the following studies I focused on cognitive tasks, 
examining whether the activation of a superstition prior to the task also influences the 
outcome of this kind of performance. Another aspect Studies 2 through 4 have in common is 
the naturalistic but rather blatant manipulation of the activated superstition. In each case the 
experimenter used words or gestures to manipulate the specific superstition. Even though the 
experimenter’s behavior was standardized across the experimental conditions, this procedure 
cannot rule out the possibility of an experimenter’s effect on the measured performance. 
Study 5 was conducted to resolve that shortcoming. In addition, the purpose of the following 
studies was to explore the process underlying the causal relationship between the activated 
superstition and subsequent superior performance.  
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In Study 5, I used a more subtle method to activate the superstitious concept. According 
to a study by DeMarree and colleagues (DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty, 2005) who 
subliminally primed (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982) participants with the lucky or unlucky 
number 7 versus 13, participants in the present study were subliminally primed with either 
the concept of “good luck” or the concept of “bad luck” before engaging in the performance 
task. With the goal of assessing performance on a cognitive task, participants in Study 5 had 
to engage in a game of Tetris, which requires especially good spatial skills. Again, I 
expected to replicate the previous findings and to demonstrate that the outcome of the 
performance task critically depends on the previously activated superstition. Specifically, 
participants who were subliminally primed with the concept of “good luck” prior to the task 
were expected to achieve a better result in the Tetris-game than participants who were 
primed with the concept of “bad luck.” I also collected several judgments concerning 
participants’ perceived confidence towards the task (self-efficacy beliefs) as well as their 
general mood in between the priming task and the performance task. The purpose of these 
judgments was to collect initial evidence for the underlying process of the observed effect. 
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As described in the introduction to the present research, in literature on the prevalence and 
development of superstitions it has often been argued that the purpose of superstitions is to 
regain a feeling of control and raise feelings of optimism and confidence. On a more 
theoretical level, all of these functions seem related to Bandura’s (1977, 1997) concept of 
self-efficacy beliefs, which refers to people’s perceived confidence to master the tasks they 
are trying to accomplish. On the other hand, numerous empirical findings on the concept of 
self-efficacy yield convincing evidence for a causal link between the perceived levels of 
efficacy and performance in various tasks. It has also been demonstrated that efficacy 
expectations can be influenced by manipulating contextual variables. Accordingly, I contend 
that activating a superstition associated with the concept of good luck may raise one’s 
perceived level of self-efficacy, in comparison to the activation of a superstition associated 
with the concept of bad luck. In turn, this heightened self-efficacy is expected to increase 
performance in a subsequent task. Study 5 was designed to find empirical evidence for this 
mediating process.  
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Participants. 26 undergraduates of the University of Cologne were recruited as 
participants and were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. They were 
contacted at the library and asked to participate in a short study that would last about 20 
minutes. Participants were offered a chocolate bar as compensation.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were run in small groups of up to three 
participants simultaneously. Upon agreeing to take part in the study, participants were led to 
the laboratory, greeted by the experimenter, and guided to a separate booth where they were 
seated in front of an 85 Hz computer monitor. All parts of this study were administered at the 
computer. The first screen contained a general introduction and the cover story. Previous 
research has shown that the prevalence and development of superstitions especially occurs if 
people experience a high level of ego-involvement for the according task (Buhrmann & 
Zaugg, 1981; Neil et al., 1981; Van Raalte, et al., 1991). Thus, I presumed that an activated 
superstition would also be most effective if participants are highly ego-involved. To generate 
a high level of ego-involvement in the participants, I used a similar cover story to the one 
administered by Van Raalte and colleagues (1991). Participants were informed that they 
were about to take part in a study examining the relationship between the ability to adapt to 
different cognitive performance tasks and the successful achievement of tasks in everyday 
life such as at one’s job or university. They were told that a fast and successful adaptation to 
different cognitive tasks would be accompanied by the ability to adapt flexibly in real life 
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situations. Therefore, people who are able to adapt quickly to cognitive tasks should be more 
successful in real life than people for whom this adaptation is more difficult. Participants 
were informed that they would successively engage into two mental tasks which require 
different cognitive abilities. Whereas the main focus of the first task would lay on verbal 
abilities, the second task would mainly require spatial skills. To reduce the time gap between 
the first and the second task, detailed instructions for both tasks were given to the 
participants at the beginning of the experiment. Each explanation was followed by a short 
practice trial to ensure participants understood the task. The first task was the conceptual 
priming task, which was embedded in a lexical decision task (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Aarts, 
Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000; Mussweiler & Förster, 2000). Instructions for this task 
pointed out that participants should focus their attention on a fixation point in the center of 
the screen and respond as soon as they detected whether a letter string presented at this 
position did or did not constitute a German word. Responses were to be given by pressing 
either a yellow or a blue computer key.  
The subliminal priming task was constructed in accordance with the suggestions of 
Bargh and Chartrand (2000). For each priming sequence, the fixation point 
(“XWXXWWX”) was first presented in the center of the computer screen for 3000 ms and 
was overwritten by the priming word (15 ms). This priming word was again overwritten by 
the fixation point (500 ms) which was then followed by the target letter string. This letter 
string remained on the screen until participants had responded by pressing the appropriate 
computer key. The three practice trials participants accomplished did not include the priming 
word but only the target letter strings of which two were neutral target letter strings (Kaktus 
[cactus], wenden [shift]) and one was a nonword (Pritzel). Of the 72 target letter strings 
during the critical priming phase, 54 were neutral words (e.g., towel) and 18 were non-
words. For half of the participants, each lexical decision trial used the word “Glück” (“good 
luck”) as a prime. For the other half of the participants each trial used the word “Pech” (“bad 
luck”) as a prime. Note that while the English expressions for good and bad luck the German 
language possesses two different words for the two opposing concepts. After completion of 
the 72 trials, participants were asked to answer a few questions before playing the Tetris 
game. These judgments assessed participants’ general mood on one item as well as their 
specific feelings towards the upcoming performance task on three critical items. On 9-point 
scales, participants had to indicate how they felt at this very moment (1 = not good at all; 9 = 
very good), how likely it was that they would do well in accomplishing the following task (1 
= very unlikely; 9 = very likely), how insecure they felt at this very moment (1 = not 
insecure at all; 9 = very insecure), and how confident they felt concerning the upcoming task 
(1 = not confident at all; 9 = very confident). Subsequently, participants were asked to 
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proceed to the second task, for which they had received detailed instructions prior to the 
priming task.  
In these instructions, participants were informed that the second task was a game of 
Tetris, which primarily calls for spatial skills. They also read the rules of the game, which 
explained that differently-shaped figures would move from the top of the screen to the 
bottom. The task was to keep these figures from piling up and reaching the top of the screen. 
Therefore, it was possible (and necessary) to either rotate the figures or to move them left or 
right using the arrow keys on the keyboard. Once participants were sure that the position of a 
figure was correct they were able to speed its movement by pressing the down arrow key. It 
was participants’ aim to position the figures such that they would build complete horizontal 
rows. A completed row then disappeared from the screen, thus leaving more room to 
position the following figures. As is common for computer games like Tetris, the level of 
difficulty continuously increased the longer the game went on. Specifically, the speed of the 
downward moving figures increased by ten percent of the previous speed after three rows 
were completed and removed. The sequence of the differently-shaped figures was 
randomized and thus could not be influenced by the participants. The game was over as soon 
as the piled up figures reached the top of the screen. Participants were informed that they 
would only have the chance to play the game once, and were asked to try to stay in the game 
as long as possible and to complete as many rows as possible. After reading these detailed 
instructions, participants engaged in a practice trial that lasted for 30 seconds. Just before the 
critical trial started, participants again were reminded of the overall goal of the game, how to 
use the arrow keys, and the importance of keeping the game going as long as possible and 
completing as many horizontal rows as possible. The Tetris game started as soon as 
participants pressed the space bar. The number of rows successfully completed by the 
participants were recorded in a separate data file.  
After the Tetris game, participants were asked to answer a few questions similar to 
those in the previous studies. Specifically, participants were asked to judge their subjectively 
perceived performance on a 9-point scale (1 = “not good at all”; 9 = “very good”). As in 
Study 4, participants were also prompted to indicate on a 9-point scale the importance of 
performing as well as possible in the Tetris game (1 = “not important at all”; 9 = “very 
important”).  
Subsequent to these questions, some self-descriptive information, including 
participants’ sex, age, field of study, and current semester were assessed. Finally, 
participants answered a funneled debriefing questionnaire which was included to assess 
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awareness of (a) the subliminal primes and (b) the real purpose of the study. None of the 
participants indicated awareness.  
After completion of all parts of the study, participants were thanked for their 
participation and given their compensation.  
In sum, Study 5 is based on a single factor design consisting of two priming conditions 
(“good luck” vs. “bad luck”).  
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The number of rows participants were able to complete during the Tetris game reflects 
their performance in that task und thus served as the main dependent measure. 
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Figure 4a. Number of completed rows in the Tetris game by subliminal priming (“good 
luck” vs. “bad luck”). Error bars represent one standard error from the mean. 
 Replicating the findings of the previous studies, inspection of Figure 4a reveals that 
the performance in the Tetris game depends on the superstition that had been activated prior 
to the task. Specifically, participants who were subliminally primed with the concept of 
“good luck” were able to complete more rows during the Tetris game (M = 18.85) than 
participants who were primed with the concept of “bad luck” (M = 12.54), t(24) = 2.11, p < 
.05. Interestingly, but consistent with the findings of the previous studies, participants’ 
perception of their own performance did not mirror the findings of the actual performance. 
Inspection of the means reveals that participants’ perception of their performance does not 
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depend on whether they had been primed with the concept of “good luck” (M = 4.15) or the 
concept of “bad luck” (M = 3.92), t < 1, ns.  
 For the present study, it was also predicted that the activation of the superstitious 
concepts of good and bad luck would affect participants’ confidence towards the upcoming 
performance task. Specifically, I expected that participants who were primed with the 
positive superstitious concept of “good luck” would report higher self-efficacy beliefs 
(Bandura, 1977, 1997) prior to the performance task than would participants who were 
primed with the negative superstitious concept of “bad luck.” This was not expected, 
however, for participants’ judgments of their general mood. Before analyzing the data, the 
three critical judgments regarding participants’ specific feelings toward the upcoming 
performance task were combined into a single score with higher values indicating higher 
levels of self-efficacy. To do so, the insecure judgment was reversed and the mean of all 
judgments was calculated (Cronbach’s  = .75).  
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Figure 4b. Means for participants’ judgments about their experienced self-efficacy by 
subliminal priming (“good luck” vs. “bad luck”). Error bars represent one standard error 
from the mean. 
Inspection of the means depicted in Figure 4b reveals that the magnitude of 
participants’ reported self-efficacy indeed depends on whether the concept of “good luck” or 
the concept of “bad luck” had been primed. Specifically, participants who were subliminally 
primed with the concept of “good luck” felt more confident towards the Tetris game (M = 
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6.87) than did participants who were primed with the concept of “bad luck” (M = 5.82), t(24) 
= 2.30, p < .04.  
Participants’ general mood, however, was not affected by the kind of the superstitious 
concept that had been primed. Specifically, subliminal priming of the concept of “good luck” 
(M = 6.31) did not lead to different judgments of participants’ general feeling than 
subliminal priming of the concept of “bad luck” (M = 5.54), t(24) = 1.09, p >.2, ns.  
As in Study 4, one item with the purpose to control for a similar level of encouragement 
between the experimental conditions was included in the present study. As expected, 
participants who were primed with the concept of “good luck” (M = 6.0) did not believe it 
was more important to perform in the Tetris game as well as possible than participants who 
were primed with the concept of bad luck” (M = 5.54), t > 1, ns.  
Mediation. Follow-up analyses examined whether self-efficacy as assessed in the 
judgment task mediated the effect of superstition activation on performance in the Tetris 
game. For this analysis, subliminal priming with “bad luck” was coded as -1 and subliminal 
priming with “good luck” was coded 1. As outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), three 
preconditions for documenting mediation are required. First, the dependent variable should 
be regressed on the independent variable to show that the independent variable predicts the 
dependent variable. In the present study, this regression refers to the effect of the subliminal 
superstition priming on the performance in the Tetris game. Second, the mediator variable 
should be regressed on the independent variable to show that the independent variable 
predicts the mediator variable. In the present study, this regression refers to the effect of the 
subliminal superstition priming on the self-efficacy judgments. Third, the dependent variable 
should be regressed on both the independent variable and the mediator variable to show that 
the mediator variable predicts the dependent variable, and accounts for at least a portion of 
the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. In the present study, 
this regression refers to the effect of perceived self-efficacy on performance in the Tetris 
game as well as the effect of the subliminal superstition priming on the performance in the 
Tetris game, controlling for the influence of self-efficacy.  
In the preceding analyses, the first premise was satisfied in that the superstition priming 
predicted performance in the Tetris game, and the second premise was satisfied in that 
superstition priming also predicted perceived self-efficacy toward the Tetris-task. To test the 
final requirement, the regression analysis examining the effect of superstition priming on 
performance was repeated, with self-efficacy also included in the equation.  
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The regression yielded a significant effect for self-efficacy,  = .53, t(24) = 3.02, p < 
.01, indicating that the more self-efficacy participants experienced the better they performed 
in the Tetris game. The direct effect of superstition priming on performance was reduced and 
rendered insignificant, from  = .40, t(24) = 2.11, p < .05 to  = .21, t(24) = 1.09, p > .28. 
To determine whether the judgments of perceived self-efficacy beliefs mediated the 
effect of the superstition activation on performance, I applied the bootstrap approach 
recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004). Bootstrapping is a nonparametric approach to 
effect-size estimation and hypothesis testing which is especially recommended for small 
sample sizes (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Furthermore, this approach 
that makes no assumption about the distributions of the variables or the sampling distribution 
of the statistic (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993; Mooney & Duval, 1993). Thus, it has been 
suggested as a way of circumventing the power problem introduced by asymmetries and 
other forms of nonnormality in the sampling distribution (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, 
West, & Sheets, 2002; Shrout & Bolger, 2002) which is apparent in other techniques for 
assessing mediation, such as the Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) (for additional discussion 
of the bootstrapping approach see Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  
The results of the bootstrapping analysis reveal that reported self-efficacy mediated the 
effect of the superstition manipulation on the performance in the Tetris task. Specifically, a 
point estimate for this indirect effect of 3.23, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.26 to 7.94 
was obtained. Because zero is not in the 95% confidence interval, it can be concluded that 
the indirect effect of self-efficacy is indeed significantly different from zero at p < .05 (two 
tailed) and thus is a statistically significant mediator of the effect of the superstition 
activation on performance (see Figure 4c).  
.43* .53**
.21 (.4*)
Performance
Self-efficacy
Superstition
 
Figure 4c. Path coefficients for mediation in Study 5. The coefficient in parentheses is 
from the analyses testing the direct effect of superstition priming on performance. * p < 
.05, ** p < .01 
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The present findings replicate the previous results and demonstrate that the activation of 
superstitious constructs such as good or bad luck causally influence subsequent performance. 
Unlike in the previous studies, performance was not measured using a motor task but rather a 
task demanding cognitive skills. Consistent with prior predictions, participants primed with 
the superstitious concept of “good luck” performed better in a subsequent game of Tetris 
than participants primed with the superstitious concept of “bad luck.” Moreover, the present 
findings suggest that this effect is mediated by participants’ confidence toward the upcoming 
task. In other words, participants experienced higher self-efficacy expectancies and therefore 
were able to complete more rows in a subsequent Tetris task after they had been primed with 
the superstitious concept of “good luck” rather than the superstitious concept of “bad luck.”  
In addition to using a new performance domain, the present study also used a new 
method of manipulating the activation of a superstitious concept. Instead of having the 
experimenter explicitly manipulate the superstition, as was done in the previous studies, a 
subliminal priming method was used to activate the opposing superstitious concepts of good 
vs. bad luck. Thus, the observed results indicate that the causal effect of superstition on 
performance is even present when the activation of the superstitious concepts occurs outside 
of people’s conscious awareness. The subliminal priming approach has at least two 
advantages compared to the rather blatant activation. First, it allows for keeping the 
experimenters blind regarding the participants’ experimental conditions, thus ruling out the 
possibility that the observed effect of the activated superstition on performance is based on 
the experimenters’ knowledge and behavior (Rosenthal, 1966). Second, as confirmed by the 
funneled debriefing questionnaire, not only the experimenter but also the participants were 
unaware of the experimental conditions and the true purpose of the study. This way, it is 
reasonable to assume that the participants neither consciously tried to comply with the 
experimental hypotheses, nor to hamper them.  
However, one might argue that simply priming the pure superstitious concepts of good 
vs. bad luck is not the same as activating a commonly known and practiced superstition (e.g. 
keeping one’s fingers crossed). At first sight, it seems that the semantic activation of a 
superstitious concept lacks the component of believing in that concept. However, upon 
closer look it becomes apparent that the purpose behind most superstitions and superstitious 
behaviors is to gain “good luck” or prevent “bad luck” from happening (Albas & Albas, 
1989; Vyse, 1997). Thus, a semantic connection between practiced superstitions and the pure 
concepts of good and back luck underlies nearly every superstitious act. This becomes 
especially apparent for examples where the superstition is already linked to the concept of 
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good or bad luck by its name, such as a lucky charm, a lucky/unlucky number, or a 
lucky/unlucky day. But other superstitions such as knocking on wood, keeping one’s fingers 
crossed, black cats, or rabbits’ tails are also semantically associated to the concepts of good 
or bad luck via their commonly known meaning. According to a spreading activation 
account of concept activation (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975) such associated concepts are 
linked, so that the activation of one concept activates the associated concept. Ultimately, 
depending on the underlying purpose of a superstition, activating such a commonly known 
and practiced superstition should thus also render the broader but certainly superstitious 
concept of good luck or bad luck accessible, just as it was done in the present study. 
Moreover, one should keep in mind that in Study 1, the great majority (85 percent) of the 
present population reported actually believing in the concepts of good and bad luck on at 
least a moderate level. 
Despite this reasoning, a final study was designed to replicate the causal link between 
the activated superstition and a subsequent performance as well as the role of perceived self-
efficacy as the underlying mediator, using a rather individualistic superstition as an 
independent variable. 
9A
Instead of activating the same superstition for all participants, those in Study 6 each 
brought their own object with a superstitious meaning. Specifically, participants were asked 
to select and wear their personal lucky charm to the experiment. Recent research has shown 
that wearing lucky charms is a commonly practiced superstitious ritual in western societies 
(Bleak & Frederick, 1998; Wiseman & Watt, 2004). In line with these findings, Study 1 in 
the present research found that 62 percent of all participants reported believing, in at least a 
moderate extent, that wearing a lucky charm actually helps them in important situations. 
Interestingly, lucky charms are special among other superstitions in that it is typically 
believed to be necessary to position the lucky charm close to the person or wear it close to 
the body in order for the object to function as a good luck-bringing object (Vyse, 1997). This 
fact was used in Study 6 to manipulate the superstition. Whereas all participants were asked 
to bring their lucky charm to the experimental session, only half of them were allowed to 
have the object with them during the performance task. The lucky charm was taken away 
from the other half of the participants by the experimenter before engaging in the 
performance task. Similar to Study 5, performance was assessed using a rather cognitive 
task. Instead of playing Tetris, however, here participants performed a Memory card game 
on the computer. The task of the game was to uncover as fast as possible and with as few 
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moves as possible 18 pairs of identically colored and shaped geometric figures. As they were 
only able to uncover two figures per move, the task demanded an especially good memory 
for spatial positions. The time and number of moves needed to complete the game was used 
as an index of performance. Participants who were allowed to keep their lucky charm during 
the performance task were expected to outperform participants whose lucky charm was taken 
away prior to the performance task. The goal of Study 6 was not just to replicate the effect of 
a superstition manipulation on performance but also to strengthen the evidence that this 
effect is mediated by participants’ perceived amount of confidence toward the performance 
task. Therefore, participants’ judgments on five critical measures of self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1997; 2006) were assessed subsequent to the manipulation and prior to the performance task. 
Participants who were allowed to keep their lucky charm while engaging in the performance 
task were expected to report higher self-efficacy beliefs than participants whose lucky charm 
was taken away prior to the performance task. According to Study 5, this difference in self-
efficacy was expected to mediate the effect of superstition on performance.  
)
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Participants. 41 female and male psychology students of the University of Cologne 
were recruited as participants and were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions. They were contacted over phone and asked to participate in two unrelated studies 
that would last about 30 minutes. In addition, participants were asked if they were in the 
possession of a lucky charm. If so, they were asked to bring the lucky charm to the 
experimental session. Participants indicating that they did not own a lucky charm were not 
invited to the experiment. Participants were offered course credit as partial fulfillment of 
their course requirements as compensation. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants were run individually by a female experimenter 
who was the same for all participants. Upon arrival, participants were led to the lab, greeted 
by the experimenter, and guided to a separate booth where they were seated in front of an 85 
Hz computer monitor. The experimenter informed participants that they were about to take 
part in two unrelated studies that were administered together for efficiency reasons and 
handed them brief instructions for the first study. Here, participants were informed that they 
would first work on a questionnaire concerning the prevalence and significance of lucky 
charms. Before filling in the questionnaire, which was administered to increase the salience 
and personal relevance of participants’ individual lucky charms and thus activate the 
superstitious concept, participants were asked whether they had indeed brought their 
personal lucky charm. If they were not wearing the object on their body (e.g. necklace, ring), 
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participants were prompted to position the object on the table in front of them. The 
questionnaire asked participants to describe the lucky charm, explain why and when the 
object had obtained its special meaning, and to suggest how the lucky charm might help in 
important situations. Additionally, participants were asked whether they had taken their 
lucky charm to an exam or another important situation before. If so, participants and were 
asked to describe where the lucky charm was kept during this situation. Furthermore, 
participants indicated on 9-point scales how important the lucky charm was to them (1 = “not 
at all important”; 9 = “very important”) and how likely it was that they would take the object 
to their next exam or another important situation (1 = “not likely at all”; 9 = “very likely”). 
After completion of the questionnaire, the experimenter explained that it was necessary to 
take a picture of the lucky charm and left the room with the object. Meanwhile, participants 
were asked to turn to the computer and read the instruction for the second study, which was 
displayed on the first screen of the monitor. Here, participants were informed that they 
would now work on a study designed to test material for a new measure of memory skills 
and concentration. With the purpose of generating high ego-involvement, participants were 
told that previous research has found a high association between high scores in these 
domains and the successful achievement of tasks in everyday life such as at oen’s job or 
university (Van Raalte, et al., 1991). Before participants were able to read further 
instructions on the following screens, the experimenter reentered the experimental laboratory 
and manipulated the independent variable. For one half of the participants, the experimenter 
handed the lucky charm back to the participants and asked them to continue with the 
experiment. For the other half, however, the experimenter did not hand the lucky charm back 
to participants. Instead, she explained that there was a problem with the camera, which a 
colleague would now try to repair. Participants were asked to continue with the experiment, 
nevertheless (i.e., without their lucky charm).   
On the next computer screen, participants read detailed instructions for the memory 
task. Specifically, they were informed that they would be presented with 36 face down game 
cards, which were arranged in a 6 x 6 square on the screen. When uncovered, these cards 
depicted geometrical figures, which differed in six shapes (e.g. circle, arrow, square) and in 
three colors (read, blue, black), respectively. Participants were informed that it was their task 
to uncover all 18 pairs depicting identical figures (shape and color) as quickly as possible 
while making as few moves as possible. One move was defined as the unvovering of two 
cards. After selecting a first card by a mouse click, participants had as much time as they 
wanted to examine the depicted figure and to choose a second card. After clicking on a 
second card, it flipped over and both cards remained exposed for three seconds before they 
were covered again. In the case that both cards depicted the identical figure, they were left 
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exposed until the end of the task. The task was finished when all 18 identical pairs were 
uncovered. The total amount of time as well as the number of trials needed to finish the task 
were recorded in a separate data file.  
Before beginning with the memory task, participants were asked to answer some 
questions about their present feelings. Specifically, participants were prompted to indicate on 
five critical items their current perceived self-efficacy toward the upcoming memory task 
(e.g. “I am confident that I will master the upcoming memory task well,” “I have trust in my 
skills for the upcoming memory task”). These items were constructed in accordance with 
Bandura’s (2006) guide for constructing self-efficacy scales. Thus, the items were written in 
terms of present capabilities, not potential or future ones. The capability judgments referred 
to the specifically upcoming memory task, not to general cognitive functioning. 
Additionally, judgments were assessed on 9-point scales (e.g., 1 = “agree not at all; 9 = 
“agree very much”), not on formerly typical but less differential 6-point scales. Upon 
completion of the self-efficacy judgments, participants began the memory game. 
Subsequently, participants evaluated their general mood (1 = “not good at all”; 9 = “very 
good”), their subjectively perceived performance (1 = “not good at all”; 9 = “very good”), 
and their beliefs about the importance of performing as well as possible in the memory game 
(1 = “not important at all”; 9 = “very important”). These judgments were followed by some 
questions assessing self-descriptive information, including participants’ sex, age, and current 
semester. At the end of the session, participants answered a questionnaire that was designed 
to assess whether they were aware of the connection between the ostensibly unrelated studies 
and the real purpose of the study. None of the participants accurately reported the real 
purpose of the study.  
In sum, Study 6 is based on a single-factor design consisting of two experimental 
conditions (“performing with lucky charm” vs. “performing without lucky charm”).  
*
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Prior to the data analysis, I calculated an index of participants’ performance on the 
memory task based on the total amount of time and the number of trials participants needed 
to complete the task. To do so, the two scores were z-transformed and the mean was 
calculated (Cronbach’s  = .68). The resulting mean score reflects participants’ performance 
in the memory game in units of the pertinent standard deviation. Note that lower scores 
indicate a better performance.  
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Figure 5a. Means (z-scores) for participants’ performance in the memory task for lucky 
charm present versus lucky charm absent condition. Error bars represent one standard 
error from the mean. Note that lower values represent higher levels of performance. 
In line with prior expectations, inspection of Figure 5a reveals that participants’ 
performance in the memory task depends on whether they were allowed to keep their lucky 
charm during the task or if it was taken away from them prior to the task. Specifically, 
participants performed better in the memory task if they had their lucky charm close to them 
during the task (M = -.27) than if their lucky charm had been taken away from them prior to 
the task (M = .28), t(39) = 2.13, p < .05. 
In addition, participants’ self-efficacy judgments were combined into a single score 
with higher values indicating higher levels of experienced self-efficacy. To do so, one of the 
five critical items on self-efficacy was reverse scored and the mean of all items was 
calculated (Cronbach’s  = .93). The resulting mean score reflects participants’ ratings of 
their perceived self-efficacy beliefs prior to the performance task.  
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Figure 5b. Means for participants’ judgments about their experienced self-efficacy 
depending on the presence versus absence of their lucky charms. Error bars represent 
one standard error from the mean.  
As predicted, inspection of the depicted means in Figure 5b reveals, that participants’ 
self-efficacy indeed depends on whether participants had to engage into the performance task 
with or without their personal lucky charm. Specifically, participants reported feeling more 
confident toward the upcoming memory task if they were with their lucky charm (M = 6.64) 
rather than without their lucky charm (M = 5.10), t(39) = 3.07, p < .01. Similar to the 
findings of the previous studies, participants’ general mood did not differ depending on 
whether they performed with their lucky charm close by (M = 6.19) or not (M = 5.50), t(39) 
= 1.02, p > .3, ns. This was also true for participants’ subjective judgments of their 
performance (with lucky charm: M = 4.57; without lucky charm: M = 4.40) and the 
perceived importance of the task (with lucky charm: M = 7.38; without lucky charm: M = 
7.20), all t < 1, ns. 
Mediaton. As in Study 5, I conducted an additional analysis to examine whether the 
reported level of perceived self-efficacy mediated the effect of the lucky charm on 
performance in the memory task. For this analysis, the absence of the lucky charm was 
coded as -1 and the presence of the lucky charm was coded as 1. As a first step, I examined 
whether the three preconditions outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) for documenting 
mediation were fulfilled. As preceding results revealed, the first premise was satisfied in that 
the presence of a superstitious object - the lucky charm - predicted performance in the 
memory task, and the second premise was satisfied in that lucky charm presence also 
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predicted perceived self-efficacy toward the memory task. To test the final requirement, the 
regression analysis examining the effect of lucky charm on performance was repeated, with 
self-efficacy also included in the equation.  
The regression yielded a significant effect for self-efficacy,  = -.49, t(39) = 3.54, p < 
.01, indicating that the more self-efficacy participants experienced the faster, and thus the 
better, they performed in the memory task. The direct effect of the lucky charm presence on 
performance was reduced and rendered insignificant, from  = -.32, t(39) = 2.13, p < .05 to  
= -.13, t(39) = .84, p > .4. 
To determine whether perceived self-efficacy beliefs mediated the effect of the lucky 
charm presence on performance the bootstrap approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) described 
in Study 5 was again applied. In line with the hypothesis, the results of these bootstrapping 
analyses reveal that reported self-efficacy mediated the effect of the lucky charm 
manipulation on the performance in the memory task. Specifically, a point estimate for this 
indirect effect of -0.18, with a 95% confidence interval of -0.41 to -0.01 was obtained. 
Because zero is not in the 95% confidence interval, it can be concluded that the indirect 
effect of self-efficacy is indeed significantly different from zero at p < .05 (two tailed) and 
thus is a statistically significant mediator of the effect of the superstition activation on 
performance (see Figure 5c). 
Performance
Self-efficacy
Superstition
.44** -.49**
-.13 (-.32*)
(lucky charm)
 
Figure 5c. Path coefficients for mediation in Study 6. The coefficient in parentheses is 
from the analyses testing the direct effect of lucky charms on performance. * p < .05, 
**p < .01 
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These findings replicate the previous results by demonstrating a causal link between the 
activation of a superstition associated with the concept of “good luck” and a superior 
outcome in a subsequent performance task. Specifically, participants in the presence of their 
own individual superstitious object were able to perform a memory task better than 
participants in the absence of their lucky charm. The results further suggest that the 
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demonstrated effect of the superstitious concept on performance was mediated by 
participants’ perceived self-efficacy, thus replicating the finding of Study 5. As anticipated, 
participants experienced higher self-efficacy and therefore were able to complete the 
memory task more efficiently when their luck-bringing object was with them rather than 
when it was kept away from them.  
Admittedly, in Study 6 the manipulation of the superstition was different from the 
previous studies in at least two ways. First, whereas the concept activated in the previous 
studies was a commonly known and widespread superstition in society, the superstitious 
objects used in Study 6 were very private and individual for each participant. Indeed, the 
objects that were brought along to the lab varied widely, including various stuffed animals, 
necklaces, wedding rings, stones, and key rings (for some examples see Figures 6a – f).  
Even though it is likely that participants knew the superstitions used in Studies 2 to 5, it 
is unlikely that every single participant actually believed in these concepts. In Study 6, 
however, only participants in the possession of a lucky charm were invited to the lab. The 
fact that for a person an original neutral object turns into a lucky charm, thus, ascribing some 
kind of supernatural luck-bringing power to it, can be seen as a first hint that participants of 
Study 6 actually developed a special relationship to the superstitious object. This notion is 
supported by participants’ own specifications concerning their lucky charm (see Appendix 
F26 f., Table 6a-d for detailed descriptive results of the lucky charm questionnaire). On 
average, participants indicated owning their lucky charm for 59.7 months (approximately 5 
years). The average judgment of the personal importance of the superstitious object (1 = “not 
important at all”; 9 = “very important”) was M = 6.78, which is significantly higher than the 
midpoint of the scale, t(40) = 7.25, p < .001.  
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a) b) c) 
   
d) e) f) 
Figure 6 a–f. Examples of lucky charms which were brought along to the experimental 
session of Study 5 [a) stuffed animal; b) necklace; c) wedding ring; d) stone; e) Chinese 
key ring; f) angel figure]   
Second, instead of activating two opposing superstitious concepts or a superstitious 
concept associated with “good luck” versus a control condition, this time a positive 
superstitious object was initially made salient for all participants. However, as described 
above, the distinct characteristic of lucky charms is that they only bear their superstitious 
nature if they are close by in the critical situation (Vyse, 1997). This fact was affirmed by 
participants in Study 6, of whom 38 out of 41 (93 percent) reported that they had taken their 
lucky charm to an important situation in the past. The average judgment of the likelihood of 
taking the object to an important situation in the future (1 = “not likely at all”; 9 = “very 
likely”) was M = 7.37, which is significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, t(40) = 
7.63, p < .001. Not surprising for the present population, 27 out of those 38 participants (71 
percent) who indicated to occasionally wear their lucky charms with them specifically 
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reported bringing their lucky charm to exams. Most importantly, all participants who 
indicated that that they had brought their lucky charm to an important situation also reported 
that they had kept the object very close by during the critical situation. Participants’ answers 
include wearing the object at their body, keeping it in their pocket, putting it on a table, or 
carrying it in their pencil case. This logic, that lucky charms bring good luck if they are kept 
close to its owner during a critical situation but lose their superstitious power if this is not the 
case, was used in designing Study 6. Ultimately, the difference between activating a positive 
versus a negative or a control superstition and activating a positive superstition that is either 
believed to function as such or for which its superstitious functioning had been revoked is 
not that great. Thus, the findings of Study 6 indeed complement the results of the previous 
studies in a meaningful way. The present findings, their relation to previous research, as well 
as their implications and future perspectives will be discussed more detailed in the following 
General Discussion.  
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There are numerous occasions in everyone’s live when we face the request to achieve 
the best performance possible. Privious research has demonstrated that precisely these 
situations often elicit the seemingly irrational thoughts and behaviors associated with 
superstitions (Keinan, 2002; Vyse, 1999). In the present thesis, I suggest that the fulfillment 
of these superstitions in the face of an upcoming performance task serves a specific 
beneficial function. In fact, from an evolutionary view, any behavior that maintains over a 
long period of time should be adaptive (Buss, 2000), and thus the notion of a superstitious 
benefit is well in line with my suggestion. According to this perspective, I derived two 
specific research questions, which I experimentally examined in the present line of research.  
First, I predicted that the activation of a superstition prior to a performance task exerts a 
causal influence on the outcome of this task. Given that superstitions are most likely held by 
athletes and students (Albas & Albas, 1989; Becker, 1975), who face performance related 
situations most frequently, a direct beneficial influence of superstition on performance rather 
than other aspects of the situation seems to be likely. Moreover, as it usually is the desire of 
an athlete or student to perform as well as possible, the most beneficial effect of a 
superstition on task performance should appear in terms of a performance enhancement. The 
results of the present research are consistent with this assumption. While Study 1 confirms 
earlier findings concerning the high prevalence of superstitions within the population of 
students and identifies several specific common superstitions, Studies 2 through 6 repeatedly 
demonstrate the causal influence of superstitions on performance. In particular, the findings 
of these studies suggest that better performance is achieved after the implementation of a 
superstition associated with the concept of good luck than after the implementation of a 
superstition associated with bad luck or no superstition at all. This effect was repeatedly 
demonstrated for both cognitive and motor tasks. Furthermore, the activated superstition as 
well as the method of implementation varied across the presented studies, and, according to 
Study 1, always used the most wide spread superstitions within the present population. 
Studies 2 and 3, for example, utilized the most common superstitious beliefs in good or bad 
luck by connecting these concepts to a golf ball, which resulted in a similar superstition as 
had been experimentally established in former research (Van Raalte et al., 1991). Supporting 
the hypothesis of a superstition-performance link, the results of both studies demonstrate that 
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participants engaging in a golf putting task using an ostensibly “lucky ball” got the ball into 
the hole more often than did participants using an ostensibly “unlucky ball”. Moreover, the 
results of Study 3 specifically demonstrate that participants’ success rate using an ostensible 
“unlucky ball” is not different from participant’s level of success in the golf-putting task for 
which the ball was not connected to any superstitious concept. This pattern of results 
indicates that superstitions associated with the positive concept of good luck are particularly 
responsible for the effect on subsequent achievement by actually enhancing task 
performance. Altering both the performance task and the activated superstition, the results of 
Study 4 show that participants for whom another person kept her fingers crossed were faster 
in finishing a motor dexterity game than participants in two control conditions. In particular, 
these results suggests that the observed performance enhancement in the experimental 
condition is indeed a specific effect of the activated superstition and cannot be attributed to 
mere encouragement.  
The second research question of the present thesis concerns the underlying mechanism 
of the obtained effect. Specifically, I contend that the influence of superstition on 
performance enhancement is mediated by participants’ perceived level of self-efficacy 
beliefs. On the one hand, research on the concept of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 
1997) suggests that people’s efficacy beliefs are susceptible to contextual influences. On the 
other hand, numerous findings verify that self-efficacy is one of the most influential factors 
on performance outcomes. Accordingly, I suggest that the implementation of a good luck 
superstition prior to a performance task leads to an increase in perceived self-efficacy toward 
the required activity, which in turn improves the final performance. The results of Studies 5 
and 6 support this reasoning. Specifically, in Study 5, the concepts of good luck or bad luck 
were primed subliminally (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; DeMarree et al., 2005) before 
participants rated their confidence toward a subsequent Tetris game. Despite the fact that the 
superstitious concepts were merely presented outside of participants’ conscious awareness, 
the results of this study indicate that participants in the good luck condition completed more 
rows in the Tetris game and thus performed better than participants in the bad luck condition. 
Moreover, the result of a mediation analyses supports the assumption that the observed effect 
is based on participants’ reported level of perceived self-efficacy beliefs. This finding was 
replicated in Study 6. Instead of priming participants with the superstitious concepts, they 
performed a Memory task either in the presence or in the absence of their personal lucky 
charm, which all participants had brought along to the experimental session. Again, the 
obtained results provide evidence for the assumed superstition-performance link, as 
participants in the presence of their lucky charm achieved a better performance in the 
Memory task than did those in the absence of the lucky charm. Importantly, this effect was 
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mediated by participants’ perceived self-efficacy beliefs, which were assessed prior to the 
actual performance task.  
Taken together, the obtained results provide evidence in support of both hypotheses. 
That is, the activation of a superstition usually performed to gain good luck leads to 
performance enhancement in a subsequent task. The mechanism underlying this effect can be 
found in an increase of perceived task-oriented self-efficacy.  
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Instead of stressing the concept of self-efficacy, one might argue that the observed 
performance enhancement after the activation of a good luck superstition could alternatively 
be explained in terms of a mood effect. A large body of research suggests that cognitive task 
performance such as problem-solving tasks, social judgment tasks or creative thinking tasks 
are influenced by preexisting mood states (Clore, et at., 1994; Forgas, 1991, 1995; Forgas & 
Bower, 1987; George & Zhou, 2002; Isen, 1999). Some of these findings provide evidence 
in support of mood-incongruent effects on performance by demonstrating that positive mood 
produced performance decrements (Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982) or negative 
mood produced performance improvement (Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & Mark, 1995). While 
other authors reported asymmetrical mood effects on task performance (Davis, Kirby, & 
Curtis, 2007), the majority of research on mood effects, however, has focused on mood-
congruent effects on performance, demonstrating enhanced performance subsequent to the 
induction of positive affective states (Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & Harackiewicz, 1996; Isen, 
Daubman, & Novicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, 
& Sujan, 1990). Several explanations have been suggested to explain the influence of mood 
on task performance. Thus, for example it has been argued that affective states exert a rather 
direct effect on task performance by influencing people’s processing strategies (Sinclair & 
Mark, 1992) or their depth of cognitive processing (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). 
Alternatively, it seems possible that performance is rather indirectly influenced by mood 
states. Thus, it has been suggested, for example, that positive mood is linked to higher self-
set goals (George & Brief, 1996; Hom & Arbuckle, 1988; Saavedra & Earley, 1991) or 
higher self-efficacy judgments (Baron, 1990; Forgas, Bower, & Moylan, 1990). In turn, both 
factors are known to foster superior performance (Bandura, 2001; Locke & Latham, 1990). 
From this perspective, the obtained effects of the present line of research seem to be 
explainable by the influence of differently induced mood states on performance outcome. 
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Given that the concept of good luck is strongly linked to positive instances or events with a 
successful outcome (Teigen, 1995) it seems possible that the activation of these superstitions 
induced a more positive mood state than the activation of superstitions associated with the 
concept of bad luck or no superstitions at all. It is important to note, however, that the 
findings of the present studies yield no evidence in support of this notion. In all but one of 
the five experimental studies (Study 3), participants’ general mood was assessed. None of 
these reports contained any indication of mood differences between experimental conditions. 
In fact, analyses revealed that reports of general mood or well-being for participants for 
whom a good luck superstition was activated did not differ significantly from judgments of 
participants for whom no superstition or a bad luck superstition was activated. In conclusion, 
the present results indicate that the obtained influence of superstition on superior 
performance is not based on the alternative explanation of a mood effect.  
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A second objection concerning the explanation for the obtained superstition-
performance link and its underlying mechanism might have to do with a communicational 
problem. One might argue that the activation of a superstition associated with the concept of 
good luck somehow functions as a request to participants to consider the task at hand as 
more important compared to the activation of a bad luck superstition or no superstition at all. 
In other words, handing someone a ball and call it a “lucky ball” might implicitly transmit 
the message that everyone else has done a very good job using this ball so far and that the 
same is expected of the present participant. Similarly, saying that I keep my fingers crossed 
for a certain participant might implicitly transmit the message that I want this person to 
perform as best as possible and to consider the task as very serious. However, handing 
someone over an “unlucky ball,” for example, or simply saying “go” as a starting signal, 
might be understood as an intention of saying “Oh, don’t worry. Don’t take the task too 
seriously. No one had done a good job with it, yet.” If this was the case, the intended 
manipulation of different superstitions might be confounded with a manipulation of the 
perceived importance of the task. While this notion hardly seems to apply to the subliminal 
priming of good versus bad luck in Study 5 or the manipulation of a lucky charm in Study 6, 
it seems plausible for Studies 2 through 4 in which the experimenter directly expressed the 
good or bad luck associated superstitions. Even though no conclusions can be drawn for the 
golfing studies, this alternative was controlled for in the following studies by assessing 
participants’ subjectively perceived importance to perform the requested task as well as 
possible. On the one hand, parts of the results of Study 4 support the assumption that the 
implementation of a good luck superstition provides more encouragement than a control 
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condition. Thus, participants for whom the experimenter kept her fingers crossed considered 
the task more important than participants for whom the experimenter gave an ordinary 
starting signal. However, this was not true for the additional control condition of this study, 
in which the superstitious phrase was changed into a phrase without a superstitious meaning. 
Nevertheless, performance enhancement was found exclusively in the experimental 
condition in which the specific good luck-associated superstition of keeping one’s fingers 
crossed was activated before the task. Furthermore, in Studies 5 and 6, the results reveal no 
indication of a difference in the perceived importance of a good performance between the 
experimental conditions. In this regard, the notion of a performance enhancement as a result 
of an implicitly transmitted request to consider the task as important can clearly be rejected.  
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In the world of sports, it is common for athletes to follow a regular routine or a certain 
ritual prior to a competition or prior to a specific performance. A diver, for example, might 
approach the springboard exactly the same way each time. A football player might always 
want to enter the field with the left foot first. Similarly, a basketball or tennis player might 
bounce the ball three times before each free throw shooting or before each serve, 
respectively. Indeed, several findings across different sports such as golf, bowling, and 
basketball suggest that these pre-performance routines enhance subsequent performance 
(Boutcher, 1990; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990; Foster, Weigand, & Baines, 2006; 
Kirschbaum, Ordman, Tomarken, & Holtzbauer, 1982; Lobmeyer & Wasserman, 1986; 
Mccann, Lavallee, & Lavallee, 2001; Predebon & Docker, 1992; Wrisberg & Pein, 1992). 
Thus, Boutcher and Crews (1987), for example, demonstrated that the introduction of a pre-
shot routine led to improved performance in a golf-putting task. Similarly, Lobmeyer and 
Wasserman (1986) as well as Gayton and colleagues (Gayton, Cielinski, Francis-Keniston, 
& Hearns, 1989) found that pre-performance routines in basketball free throw shooting 
significantly contribute to the accuracy of the shot. Specifically, they demonstrated that the 
execution of the pre-shot ritual enhanced free throw performance, while this performance 
declined when pre-performance rituals were disrupted. At first glance, this functioning seems 
to be very similar to the results obtained in the present line of research. In particular, one 
might ask whether there is any difference between superstitions and pre-performance 
routines. While in some cases it might be difficult to draw the line between the two concepts 
(Vyse, 1997), superstitious thoughts and behaviors can often be clearly distinguished from 
pre-performance routines (Bleak & Frederick, 1998; Czech, Ploszay, & Burke, 2004; 
Lobmeyer & Wasserman, 1986). First, the pre-performance routines of an athlete or a team 
often are developed and taught by an expert such as a sport psychologist, for example (Bleak 
 7+

 *=
& Frederick, 1998). In contrast, superstitions are usually learned idiosyncratically by 
classical and operant conditioning, or are socially-shared beliefs and behaviors that are 
imitated from or taught by other team members. A second difference between superstitions 
and pre-performance routines refers to their context. A behavior becomes superstitious when 
it is given a special, magical meaning, which usually refers to external powers and the 
perception of luck (Vyse, 1997). Pre-performance routines, however, clearly focus on 
cognitive self-control as a means of directly influencing an athlete’s performance outcome 
(Bleak & Frederick, 1998). This brings us to the final difference between these concepts, the 
mechanisms underlying enhanced performance. The findings of the present research indicate 
that performance enhancement subsequent to the activation of a good luck superstition is 
mediated by the strength of participants’ self-efficacy beliefs. That is, the activated 
superstition affects people’s judgments concerning their own capabilities to perform a task. 
Pre-performance routines, however, have been found to affect performance outcome via 
different mechanisms. Specifically, it has been suggested that pre-performance routines 
improve concentration, help focus attention, and eliminate distraction by associating 
concentration to specific routines (Schmid & Pepper, 1998; Weinberg & Gould, 2003). 
Moreover, it has been proposed that pre-performance routines serve the purpose of “motor 
priming,” which allows the athlete to perform the task at hand via an automatized motor 
sequence (Czech et al., 2004; Van Raalte et al., 1991). In this respect, pre-performance 
routines prevent the athlete from detrimental thoughts about the outcome, negative thoughts, 
or the actual physical process of the action (Boutcher & Crews, 1987). Focusing on the 
actual physical process has been demonstrated to inhibit overlearned or automated behavior 
(Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970; Zimring, 1983).  
Taken together, it is evident that the superstitions manipulated in the present line of 
research can clearly be distinguished from pre-performance routines. In fact, all of the 
activated superstitions are strongly associated with the concept of luck and none of the 
manipulations includes a behavioral ritual performed by the participant. In this regard, the 
present empirical findings are novel in their specific contribution to the understanding of 
superstitious functioning. 
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Despite the assumption that superstitious thoughts and behaviors would slowly fade as 
our contemporary world grows richer in education and technical understanding (Campbell, 
1996; Vyse, 1997) it instead seems that the opposite is true. As described earlier, the 
prevalence of superstitions may have even increased throughout the last decades (Sasol 
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Olefins & Surfactants, 2005; Wiseman, 2003). What is it that makes superstitions so 
persistent? Similar to the claims of other theorists, in the present research I argue that the 
high prevalence and maintenance of superstitions could be explained by a beneficial function 
of these thoughts and behaviors. Specifically, I proposed a causal influence of superstitions 
on superior performance outcomes. As outlined before, the present results indeed indicate 
that the activation of a superstition that usually is performed to gain good luck leads to better 
achievements in a subsequent performance task. However, the question remains whether this 
performance enhancement is responsible for the retention of superstitions. Importantly, 
according to the present results, participants do not seem to consciously notice the 
performance enhancement as a result of the activated good luck superstition. Despite an 
objectively measured increase in performance, participants’ subjective judgments concerning 
their achieved performance do not mirror this difference in performance outcome. 
Specifically, in all of the experimental studies in which subjective performance judgments 
were assessed (all except Study 3), the results indicated that participants did not believe that 
they had actually done better in the good luck condition rather than in the bad luck or in the 
neutral condition.  
If people are not consciously aware of the performance enhancement, why are they 
nevertheless committed to upholding the superstitious thoughts and actions? One reason 
suggested by the present data could be that people perceive the increased feeling of self-
efficacy as the crucial psychological benefit of superstitious actions. As the present findings 
reveal, people seem to be well aware of this heightened level of self-efficacy in the context 
of a good luck superstition and are able to report on this improved feeling. Therefore, the 
increase in self-efficacy might be experienced as an important outcome of superstitions in 
and of itself, and might thus even be the stronger cause for the high persistence of 
superstitions than the link between a superstition and superior performance. In fact, this 
perspective is well in line with a theoretical reasoning by Schippers and Van Lange (2006) 
who also suggested that the psychological benefits of superstitious rituals might outweigh 
the more distal relationship between the enactment of rituals and the outcome of an event. 
Together, the present findings support the notion of a beneficial functioning of superstitions 
in terms of performance enhancement, but suggest that the most important factor for the 
existence and maintenance of superstitions might be an increase in people’s self-efficacy.  
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Performance depends on several factors, including those within the person engaging in 
the task as well as situational characteristics. Probably, the most important factors affecting 
performance outcomes are the level of ability required for the task and the degree of 
motivation for that task (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). However, prior research also has 
identified several seemingly irrelevant factors that contribute to achievement outcomes. For 
example, Friedman and Elliot (2008) examined the effect of a proprioceptive cue such as 
arm crossing on performance in anagram-tasks. Similarly, previous research demonstrated a 
relationship between specific colors and intellectual (Elliot & Maier, 2008; Elliot, Maier, 
Moller, Friedman, & Meinhardt, 2007) and physical performance (Frank & Gilovich, 1988; 
Hill & Barton, 2005).  
The present line of research extends these findings by suggesting another causal 
influence on performance by a factor that, at least at first glance, seems to be irrational. 
Thus, the findings demonstrate that activating a positive superstition prior to a performance 
task increases people’s perceived efficacy expectancies toward this task, which in turn leads 
to better performance. Thus, the present findings represent the first empirical demonstration 
of a replicable effect of superstition on performance using controlled experimental research 
designs. Interestingly, despite the fact that research investigating influences on achievement 
behavior abounds, most studies focus on instances in which performance is undermined. As 
such, the present research uniquely contributes to the quest of identifying factors that 
improve task performance.  
			.	(
Despite the novelty of the present results, they are clearly in line with numerous 
findings described earlier demonstrating a causal influence of perceived self-efficacy on 
subsequent achievement behavior. Congruent with the conclusions of previous studies in the 
athletic or academic context (Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Feltz et al., 2008; Moritz et al., 
2000; Schunk & Pajares, 2004), the present findings indicate that people who are more 
confident regarding their capabilities to master a task indeed achieve a better outcome in this 
task than people with lower feelings of confidence. However, while those former studies put 
their focus on either athletic or cognitive achievements, the present line of studies is unique 
in that it combines both contexts within one line of research.  
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The present findings also shed further light on the relationship between superstitions 
and self-efficacy beliefs. The findings clearly indicate a direct effect of an activated good 
luck superstition on enhanced feelings of task-specific self-efficacy. Thus, the present 
findings represent the first empirical evidence for this causal effect, despite the many 
speculations and assumptions concerning a relationship between these two constructs. In 
fact, the very first research on superstitions and its related personality variables even 
suggested a negative correlation between superstition and self-efficacy (Tobacyk & 
Schrader, 1991). However, this research seemed to have many weaknesses that left some 
doubts about the results. First, to assess superstition, the authors used the superstition 
subscale of the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), which 
consists exclusively of negative, bad luck related superstitions. However, many surveys and 
studies on the subject of superstition have revealed that the majority of people engage in 
positive, good luck-related superstitions more often than in negative superstitions (Albas & 
Albas, 1989; Wiseman, 2003; Wiseman & Watt, 2004). Second, to measure participants’ 
self-efficacy, the authors used a very general self-efficacy scale. According to Bandura 
(2006), however, self-efficacy beliefs are best measured by scales that are specific to 
particular domains of functioning rather than ones that asses global efficacy expectations that 
are devoid of context. It is possible that such a global, unspecific measure of self-efficacy as 
used by Tobacyk and Schrader reflects a general feeling of uncertainty, uncontrollability, 
and low confidence rather than a task-specific measure of perceived efficacy. From this 
perspective, the reported negative correlation between superstitions and their measure of 
self-efficacy can easily be viewed as in line with other findings demonstrating an increased 
appearance of superstitious thoughts and behaviors in situations characterized by perceived 
feelings of uncontrollability and uncertainty (Keinan, 1994, 2002; Malinowski, 1954; 
Rudski, 2004; Vyse, 1997). In this sense, it seems likely that the findings of Tobacyk and 
Schrader do not necessarily contradict the findings in the present line of research. In fact, 
knowing that superstitions most often occur under those specific situational conditions, many 
researchers have suggested that superstitions are related to adaptive, beneficial personality 
functioning (Keinan, 2002; Neil, 1980; Rothbaum et al., 1982; Womack, 1979) rather than to 
less effective functioning as indicated by the results of Tobacyk and Schrader (1991). 
Specifically, as described earlier, some of these previous assumptions and findings point to 
beneficial psychological functions of superstitions that seem to be very similar to the 
presently examined concept of self-efficacy. Rudski (2001), for example, found a positive 
relation between superstition and perceived confidence in future performance. Dudley (1999) 
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and Matute (1994) demonstrated an effect of superstition on perceived feelings of 
controllability. Moreover, Day and Maltby (2003, 2005) suggested a positive correlation 
between the belief in good luck and hope, optimism, and psychological well-being. Looking 
back at these previous results it seems that all of them assessed individual aspects of the self-
efficacy construct, that might be particularly central in performance-related situations. In this 
regard, the findings of the present research are the first to demonstrate the causal influence of 
an activated superstition on enhanced feelings of perceived task-specific self-efficacy using 
rigorous experimental methods.  
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Undoubtedly, the present findings are unique in their contribution to a deeper 
understanding of the influence of superstitions on subsequent task performance. The present 
research presents at least three novel findings that have not been empirically demonstrated 
before. First, the reported results indicate that activated superstitions associated with the 
concept of good luck lead to higher self-efficacy perceptions concerning a subsequent 
achievement task, compared to superstitions associated with the concept of bad luck. Second, 
the present findings repeatedly demonstrate that implemented superstitions affect subsequent 
task performance, indicating that good luck superstitions lead to better outcomes than do bad 
luck superstitions or no superstitions at all. Finally, the present data suggest that the effect of 
superstition on performance enhancement is mediated by participants’ perceived level of 
self-efficacy beliefs.  
As it is true for most work exploring novel fields of research, however, the present 
thesis also raises further questions that might be examined in future research. One of these 
questions concerns the core mechanism through which raised efficacy beliefs enhance 
performance in the current context of superstitions. In fact, existing literature on the effects 
of self-efficacy on cognitive, motivational, and affective processes identifies several factors 
that may account for the influence on performance outcome. 
Reflecting on cognitive factors first, a great deal of research has demonstrated that 
beliefs of self-efficacy affect the type of goals that people select (Zimmerman, 2005). More 
specifically, previous findings indicate that individuals who feel capable of performing a 
particular task are likely to set more challenging and more specific goals rather than 
individuals with lower levels of perceived confidence (Bandura, 1986; Cleary & 
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Zimmerman, 2001; Zimmernan & Bandura, 1994; Zimmerman, Bandura, & Martinez-Pons, 
1992). These findings are important, as goal-setting theory predicts that particularly 
challenging and specific goals lead to the most positive outcomes (Locke & Latham, 1990). 
From this perspective, it appears possible that individuals who experienced higher self-
efficacy due to the implementation of a good luck superstition set higher and more specific 
goals for the required performance task, and thus achieved better outcomes than participants 
in the other experimental conditions.  
Another cognitive factor that has been identified to account for the effect of self-
efficacy on performance are causal attributions (Weiner, 1986). Thus, it has been shown that 
individuals with a strong sense of efficacy believe performance outcomes to be personally 
controllable (Bandura, 1997), so they tend to attribute failure to insufficient effort or 
deficient knowledge, which are factors that they can change (Bandura, 1994; Zimmerman & 
Cleary, 2006). Conversely, individuals with a low sense of self-efficacy attribute failure to 
factors they cannot change, thereby increasing feelings of despair and helplessness (Silver, 
Mitchell, & Gist, 1995). These types of attributions are particularly important as they 
encourage people to make adaptive changes in their achievement strategies and thus affect 
performance. A similar process may have come to play in the present studies. Applying this 
notion to the golf-putting task, for example, it seems to be likely that highly efficacious 
participants in the lucky ball condition attributed failures in the initial trials of the putting 
task to personal controllable factors and thus made adaptive changes in the following trials. 
In contrast, low efficacious participants in the unlucky ball condition might have attributed 
initial failures to uncontrollable factors and thus were not able to improve their performance 
throughout the following trials. 
Apart from these cognitive factors, motivational processes might just as well drive the 
effect of self-efficacy beliefs on performance outcomes. Abundant findings demonstrate that 
self-efficacy beliefs contribute to motivation in several ways: They determine how much 
effort people expend in a task, how long they persevere in this task despite difficulties, and 
how they approach a difficult task (Bandura, 1986, 1994, 1997; Pajares, 1996; Schunk, 1981; 
Schunk & Hanson, 1985). Specifically, it has been shown that people who have a strong 
belief in their capabilities exert more vigorous effort in their actions than people who have 
doubts about their capabilities (Schunk, 1981; Schunk & Hanson, 1985; Salomon, 1984). 
Similarly, individuals who regard themselves as highly efficacious are more persistent and 
less likely to quit in the face of obstacles and failures than individuals with low efficacy 
beliefs (Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Bouffard-Bouchard, Parent, & Larivée, 1991; Brown & 
Inouye, 1978; Lyman, Prentice-Dunn, Wilson, & Bonfilio, 1984; Multon, Brown, & Lent, 
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1991; Zimmerman & Ringle, 1981). Furthermore, people with high assurance in their 
capabilities approach difficult tasks as challenges to be mastered rather than as threats to be 
avoided. In contrast, people who doubt their capabilities shy away from difficult tasks, which 
they view as personal threats (Bandura, 1986, 1994; Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1999). All of 
these findings are of particular importance because the motivational factors of effort, 
persistence or task choice are known to contribute to effects of efficacy beliefs on 
accomplishments (Bandura, 1997). Hence, these motivational aspects should also be 
considered as potential mediating factors for the observed effect in the present line of 
research. It seems reasonable to assume that people who are primed with good luck, for 
example, have higher levels of self-efficacy and, therefore, exert greater as well as more 
persistent effort toward the required performance task than do people who are primed with 
bad luck. A similar perspective seems to be applicable with regard to affective processes that 
are known to be influenced by self-efficacy beliefs and likely to contribute to its effects on 
performance. Thus, it has been shown that people’s level of functioning can be impaired 
when a low sense of efficacy leads to higher stress, anxiety and irrational or disturbing 
thoughts, rather than a stronger belief in one’s own capabilities (Bandura, 1994).  
Together, the existing literature on cognitive, motivational, and affective consequences 
of self-efficacy beliefs suggests a host of factors through which efficacy contributes to 
performance. In fact, many of these factors even appear to influence each other. For the 
present findings, several of the identified and outlined processes seem to be likely 
contributors that might account for the repeatedly demonstrated effect of superstition on 
performance mediated by self-efficacy beliefs. This is not to say that I assume only one of 
these factors to play the central role. Rather, I would expect that different processes might 
come into play for different requirements of the performance task and that most often several 
of these factors intertwine in their contribution to performance enhancement as a result of 
raised self-efficacy beliefs. Future research might examine some of these factors and shed 
further light on the underlying mechanisms.  
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A second possible issue for future research might concern the question of whether the 
observed effect in the present studies accounts for all kinds of superstitions or whether one 
has to differentiate between various forms of superstitions. Admittedly, the field of 
superstitions includes a wide range of multifarious thoughts and behaviors. One way to 
categorize these various forms of superstitions, for example, might be to distinguish them in 
regard to their origins. Thus, some superstitions are socially transmitted whereas others 
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develop as idiosyncratic beliefs (Rudski, 2003). Although the present research did not intend 
to focus on this distinction, but rather used those superstitions for which many individuals of 
the present population indicated knowledge or belief, the current results offer some 
suggestions concerning the effectiveness of both kinds of superstitions. Specifically, the 
reported findings indicate that there is no essential difference between socially transmitted 
and idiosyncratic developed superstitions regarding their influence on task performance. In 
other words, regardless of whether the experimental manipulation included a typically 
socially transmitted superstition such as “keeping one’s fingers crossed” or an idiosyncratic 
superstition such as a “lucky charm,” the results were the same. For both types, the findings 
demonstrate performance enhancement if the activated superstition prior to the performance 
task was associated with the concept of good luck than if the activated superstition related to 
the concept of bad luck.  
Another way of categorizing the various forms of superstitions, which has been 
suggested by several authors, refers to the purpose for which they are executed. More 
specifically, these authors claim that there is a clear distinction between those superstitions 
that are performed to bring good luck and those superstitions that serve the purpose of 
warding off bad luck (Albas & Albas, 1989; Wiseman & Watt, 2004). However, the simple 
attempt to think of clear examples for each kind of superstitions raises doubts as to whether 
this distinction is always as clear as suggested. Surely, for some examples, like the well-
known behavior of knocking on wood, it seems rather easy to categorize the behavior as 
belonging to the group of bad luck-avoiding superstitions. However, given a lucky charm, 
for example, one might wonder whether this very common superstition should be allotted to 
the good luck-bringing or the bad luck-avoiding kind of superstitions. In fact, it seems 
possible that its purpose differs between individuals. Similarly, it might even be possible that 
the meaning of such a particular superstition changes over time. A lucky charm that was 
believed to bring an extra bit of good luck in the beginning of an athletic career, for example, 
might later be worn to competitions in order to prevent failures or injuries. Essentially, the 
borders between these two forms seem to be blurred, as on a more general level, both kinds 
of superstitions are directed toward a successful outcome – a “happy ending.” Nevertheless, 
or rather because of these intertwined meanings, it might be interesting for future research to 
more explicitly examine the consequences of bad luck-avoiding superstitions on subsequent 
performance. In the light of the results reported here, one might predict that these kinds of 
superstitions should not affect performance, as they are semantically associated with the 
concept of bad luck. In this regard, their functioning might be similar to those superstitious 
thoughts and behaviors that literally call for bad luck such as an unlucky golf-ball, a black 
cat, a broken mirror, or Friday the 13th. On the other hand, it might be just as plausible to 
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assume that bad luck avoiding superstitions enhance performance outcomes in a similar way 
as good luck associated superstitions because of their tendency to focus on successful 
outcomes. Further research may be conducted to address this question.  
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To examine the consequences of superstitions on the perception of self-efficacy and 
task performance, the present line of research used a novel methodological approach. Instead 
of having participants experience a lucky or unlucky event prior to a task (Darke & 
Freedman, 1997b), creating an illusion of control (Matute, 1994; Rudski, 2001), or 
measuring participants’ existing beliefs in superstitions (Dudley, 1999), the present research 
implemented a superstition by semantically activating the concept. On the one hand, this 
approach yields several advantages over the previously used methods. Rather than measuring 
the extent of superstitious beliefs and dividing participants in low- and high-believers, for 
example, the present method allows for randomized experimental conditions. A second 
advantage compared to the manipulation of Darke and Freedman (1997b) who had 
participants experience a lucky or unlucky event is that in the studies reported here, 
participants of different conditions did not actually have different experiences prior to the 
performance task. Hence, it seems more likely that the reported effects on self-efficacy and 
task performance can actually be traced back to the manipulation of the superstition itself 
rather than due to the emotions evoked by the experience, like happiness or disappointment. 
Finally, one of the most important advantages of the present method is its multisided 
applicability. Instead of creating only one specific and very restricted belief, as occurred in 
various reinforcement studies (Catania & Cutts, 1963; Matute, 1994; Ono, 1987; Rudski, 
2001), the present approach enables the examination of numerous superstitions and their 
potential influences. Moreover, for the studies reported here it is particularly true that the 
different activated superstitions (keeping fingers crossed, lucky charm, concept of good luck) 
are identical to those superstitions that are exhibited most often in the examined population. 
Thus, the research moves much closer to the phenomenon of superstitious thoughts and 
behaviors that are common in real live compared to research examining rather artificial 
induced illusory beliefs (Matute, 1994; Rudski, 2001).  
On the other hand, the method of activating superstitions might bear some risks or leave 
some questions open, as well. For example, it seems difficult to draw a final conclusion from 
the present results concerning the question whether it is necessary for a superstition to affect 
task performance to actually believe in this superstition or whether it is sufficient to know 
this particular superstition and its supposed meaning. As has been described before, it is true 
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for the present studies that only the most prevalent superstitions were used for experimental 
manipulation. Given the results of Study 1, I might assume that the majority of participants 
in the following experiments actually believed in these variants of superstition at least on a 
moderate level. Nevertheless, the present results do not allow me to discriminate between 
those participants who believe in the activated superstitions and those who merely know 
these concepts or are aware of their semantic association to good luck and thus, to successful 
outcomes. Hence, two alternatives seem possible: Either only those participants who believe 
drive the reported effect of superstition on task performance, or, all participants produce the 
reported findings because mere knowledge and its semantic associations are sufficient for the 
influence. In light of the findings in Study 5 indicating that the superstitious concept of good 
luck exerts an influence on self-efficacy and thus leads to performance enhancement even if 
the concept was presented outside of participants’ conscious awareness, the latter alternative 
appears particularly plausible. Specifically, due to the method of subliminal priming, it 
seems questionable as to whether in this study participants actually experience a sense of 
believing, or whether the effect was due to the pure semantic activation of the superstitious 
concepts of good versus bad luck.  
From this perspective, the present findings appear to fit with several theoretical 
approaches to explaining priming effects on behavior (see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; 
Wheeler & Petty, 2001, for reviews). According to Bargh’s (1990) auto-motive model of 
motivation, for example, the reported effect of superstition on performance enhancement 
might entail the nonconscious activation of a performance goal, which in turn might account 
for the reported influence on perceived self-efficacy beliefs (Schunk & Miller, 2002; Schunk 
& Rice, 1991; Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996). Another framework that explains priming 
effects on stereotypes (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996, Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 
1998), traits (Bargh et al., 1996; Kawakami, Young, & Dovidio, 2002), or habits (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000) on behavior is the Active-Self account (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 
2007). The most central proposition of this account concerns the involvement of the self in 
prime-to-behavior effects. More specifically, the Active-Self account holds that “primed 
constructs can affect behavior by temporarily altering the active (current accessible) self-
concept” (Wheeler, et al., 2007, p. 236). Applying this view to the present research, the 
activated superstitions, which might represent a priming of the concept of good luck and its 
contents, may create changes in the active self-concept and might thus influence the level of 
perceived self-efficacy beliefs.  
In the present set of studies, I did not seek to test which of the theoretical frameworks 
would fit best to explain the observed effect of activated good luck superstitions on 
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subsequent performance enhancement. Future research, however, should focus on this issue 
and examine more closely whether unconscious goal activation or temporary changes in the 
self-concept account best for the demonstrated influences. However, it might first be 
necessary to answer the question of whether the observed effect is based on the actual 
experience of believing in an activated superstition or whether the findings represent a mere 
semantic priming effect.  
1
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Due to its nature, research on superstition necessarily seems to call for applied 
implications. Although, one should always keep in mind that superstitions are no panacea, 
the applications of superstitions nevertheless seem plausible for several areas. In the athletic 
as well as the educational field, for example, it seems crucial to promote achievement 
outcomes as much as possible. Many studies suggest new ways to adjust or improve training 
methods (Raab, Masters, & Maxwell, 2005), learning materials (Otto & McDonald, 1951; 
Schank & Cleary, 1995), teaching styles (Bowers, 1961; Schwartz, Merton, & Bursik, 1987), 
and alike in order to approach this goal. The present thesis provides an interesting 
perspective by introducing an additional factor that may facilitate performance. Specifically, 
the current data suggests that both motor and cognitive performance can be enhanced by 
implementing a good luck superstition prior to the task. Why should this knowledge not be 
used? As a matter of fact, looking at the ubiquity of superstitious beliefs and behaviors it 
seems that the beneficial functioning of superstitions has already been discovered. However, 
until today, those who hold superstitious beliefs or perform superstitious actions are often 
patronized. A professional athlete who admits to wear a certain piece of lucky clothing, for 
example, can count on humorous media reports mocking this behavior. The present findings 
might thus help to increase people’s understanding of these behaviors and their effective 
beneficial functions. Moreover, in addition to simply increasing the acceptance of 
superstitions, we might also wish to systematically embed superstitions in everyone’s life. 
This notion seems to be especially likely in the educational context of children. No matter 
whether they engage in achievement tasks in school, in sport, or other areas such as art, 
music, or dance, for example, the present results suggest that children might profit of an 
implemented superstition. From this perspective, it might be plausible to literally teach 
children the use of good luck-related thoughts or behaviors. That is, instead of waiting until a 
superstition arises accidentally it might be helpful to actively develop a particular good luck- 
related thought. Similar to the golf-putting studies, for example, the concept of good luck 
could repeatedly be combined with a specific toy or another object until a personal lucky 
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charm is created. This learned superstitious thought or action could be routinely 
implemented prior to a demanding or important performance task.  
This is not to say that children should create an understanding of the world that is build 
on superstitions, or that the activated superstition will always lead to best performance 
outcomes. The  present results do not indicate, for example, that the influence of superstition 
on performance could somehow exceed the influence of knowledge, skill, and ability. 
Nevertheless, an activated good luck superstition might facilitate performance within the 
given limits of existing abilities. More specifically, an activated superstition might first 
increase self-efficacy, through which the individual might feel a stronger sense of confidence 
and security in the face of an achievement task. In this regard, a lucky pen at a written test, a 
lucky charm at a swimming meet, or a good luck saying before a play might represent 
helpful techniques to overcome feelings of anxiety and insecurity, and to boost assurance in 
one’s own capabilities. As the results suggest, this strengthened feelings of perceived 
efficacy will in turn enable the individuals to perform at a higher level than would have been 
possible if anxiety or low confidence had haunted their performance.  
As outlined above, many people already seem to have embraced the strategy of 
activating their own personal superstition prior to an achievement task in order to bring 
about the best possible results. Especially students and athletes seem to adopt this promising 
approach. However, even within these populations one can find differences in the popularity 
of superstitions. Thus, previous research has demonstrated a positive correlation between the 
number of exhibited superstitions and the level of athletic ability (Buhrmann & Zaugg, 
1981). Despite the knowledge that correlations are difficult to interpret, many have taken this 
to mean that better athletes within a team or superior teams subsequently exhibit more 
superstitious behavior than poorly performing athletes within a team or inferior teams. 
However, in light of the present results, the opposite interpretation seems just as likely. Thus, 
this positive correlation might actually indicate that those who engage in superstitions 
perform better within their team rather than those who do not engage in superstitious 
thoughts or behaviors. Indeed, next to the present findings, the best proof for this notion 
might very well be Michael Jordan’s blue North Carolina shorts.  
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The present thesis attempted to examine the effect of activated, commonly-known 
superstitions on subsequent performance in both motor and cognitive tasks. Specifically, I 
predicted that an implemented superstition related to the concept of good luck would exert a 
causal influence on subsequent performance enhancement. This proposal was drawn from 
previous findings indicating a consistently high prevalence and maintenance of superstitions, 
particularly among students and athletes, who engage in performance tasks more often than 
any other population. A specific beneficial effect of superstitions could thus explain its high 
persistence.  
In addition to the behavioral consequences of superstitions, the present thesis also 
attempted to examine the underlying process of the assumed superstition-performance link. 
Building on findings concerning performance influences in general as well as previous 
research on psychological benefits of superstitions, I focused on the concept of perceived 
self-efficacy as mediating factor. Specifically, I predicted that an implemented good luck 
related superstition prior to a performance task would increase people’s perceived level of 
self-efficacy toward this task, which in turn should lead to higher task performance 
compared to an implemented bad luck superstition or no superstition at all.  
In light of the present data, superstitions that are held or performed in order to gain 
good luck appear to be as prevalent in the present population as reported elsewhere. 
Moreover, these good luck-related superstitions indeed seem to exert an influence by 
fostering superior performance outcomes. This is not to say that superstitions are the only or 
the most powerful predictor of performance, but they clearly contribute to achievement 
outcomes and should thus be accounted for in general models of performance influences.  
The data reported here do not only confirm the assumption of the superstition-
performance link, but also yield evidence for the notion of self-efficacy as the mediating 
construct. In this regard, the present findings are clearly in line with previous literature on 
theoretical models, such as Bandura’s (1986) Social-Cognitive Theory, or diverse research 
areas such as performance influences or correlates of superstition.  
Because of the small number of existing experimental studies on superstition and its 
effects, it is not surprising that many questions still remain unsolved. The present findings, 
for example, do not indicate whether the increase in self-efficacy that follows superstition 
activation leads to performance enhancements via more effort, higher persistence, higher 
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self-set goals, or other mechanisms. In addition to this question, further research might also 
explore differences between various forms of superstitions, such as idiosyncratic developed 
versus socially-shared superstitions. Moreover, it might be interesting to investigate whether 
the pure activation of a known superstition is sufficient for its effect on performance, or 
whether one actually has to believe in the superstition. In this regard, the presented thesis 
appears to be a promising starting point for future research on this interesting phenomenon.  
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Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and frequencies for judgments “To what extent 
would you describe yourself as superstitious?” and “What do you think, how much influence 
have these superstitions in specific situations?” 
 
 Descriptives Frequencies on 9-point scale 
 N Mean SD 
N (%) 
„not at 
all/somewhat“  
(1-3) 
N (%) 
 „moderate“ 
 
 (4-6) 
N (%) 
 „fairly/ ” 
very much“ 
(7-9) 
superstitious 173 3.77 1.76 91 (52.6) 70 (40.5) 12 (6.9) 
effective 172 4.02 2.11 73 (42.4) 78 (45.3) 21 (12.2) 
 
Note, N depicts the number of valid responses out of a total of 173 participants. 
 
  
Table 2: Frequencies of entries regarding specific superstitions in open response format 
ordered by number of reports  
 
 N (%) 
None (missings in first response)  16 (9) 
Wearing a lucky charm 93 (54) 
Knocking on wood 49 (28) 
Wearing lucky clothes  15 (9) 
Friday, 13th is unlucky day 15 (9) 
Performing a ritual/getting dressed in ritual order 13 (8) 
Believing in horoscope/zodiac sign 12 (7) 
Black cat crossing street brings bad luck 11 (6) 
Avoid walking under ladders 10 (6) 
Having a lucky number 8 (5) 
Keeping fingers crossed 7 (4) 
Wish on a shooting star comes true 5 (3) 
Using lucky pen 5 (3) 
Lighting a candle to prevent bad luck from happening 5 (3) 
Touching a chimney sweeper brings good luck 4 (2) 
Breaking a mirror brings bad luck 4 (2) 
Broken glass brings good luck 4 (2) 
Bad things will happen when said out loud 4 (2) 
Others 55 (32) 
 
Note, multiple responses of up to six entries were allowed. Values in parentheses 
represent the number of reports as percentages of all participants (N = 173). 
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Table 3: Frequencies of entries regarding specific situations in which superstitions are 
exhibited ordered by number of responses  
 
 N (%) 
None (missings in first response)  23 (13) 
Verbal exams/written tests 101 (58) 
Daily life 33 (19) 
Severe and important situations 28 (16) 
Athletic competitions/public performances 26 (15) 
When hoping that things turn out well 14 (8) 
Traveling/in the car 12 (7) 
Maintain good fortune after saying things out loud 12 (7) 
Avoiding misfortunes 10 (6) 
Health issues 10 (6) 
When experiencing fear or worries 9 (5) 
Others 7 (4) 
 
Note, multiple responses of up to four entries were allowed. Values in parentheses 
represent the number of reports as percentages of all participants (N = 173). 
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Table 4a: Means, standard deviations, and frequencies for judgments on specific 
superstitious behaviors (see Appendix A1) ordered by the number of people who rated them 
at least moderately effective 
 
 Descriptives Frequencies on 9-point scale 
 N Mean SD 
N (%)  
„not at 
all/somewhat“  
(1-3) 
N (%)  
„moderate“  
 
 (4-6) 
N (%)  
„fairly/  
”very much“ 
(7-9) 
Good/bad luck 168 6.15 2.14 25 (14.9) 61 (36.3) 82 (48.8) 
Fingers 
crossed 171 4.60 2.46 63 (36.8) 62 (36.3) 46 (26.9) 
Lucky charm 171 4.68 2.49 65 (38.0) 56 (32.7) 46 (26.9) 
“Lucky piglet” 171 4.16 2.35 75 (43.9) 59 (34.5) 37 (29.2) 
Four-leaf 
clover 170 3.49 2.49 95 (55.9) 48 (28.2) 27 (15.9) 
Chimney 
sweeper 170 3.32 2.67 107 (62.9) 33 (19.4) 30 (17.6) 
Belief in 
horoscope 170 3.04 2.23 110 (64.7) 43 (25.3) 17 (10.0) 
Knocking on 
wood 170 2.59 2.36 131 (77.1) 21 (12.4) 18 (10.6) 
Breaking 
mirror 170 2.30 2.08 137 (80.6) 22 (12.9) 11 (6.5) 
Black cat on 
street 169 1.96 1.88 142 (84.0) 20 (11.8) 7 (4.1) 
Friday, 
thirteenth 171 1.87 1.56 148 (86.5) 19 (11.1) 4 (2.3) 
 
Note, N depicts the number of valid responses out of a total of 173 participants. 
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Table 4b: Frequencies for reports regarding the existence of “lucky numbers” and 
“lucky days” 
 
  Existence of lucky number/lucky day 
 N N (%) affirmation N (%) denial 
Lucky number 170 71 (41.8) 99 (58.2) 
Lucky day 168 21 (12.5) 147 (87.5) 
 
Note, N depicts the number of valid responses out of a total of 173 participants. 
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Table 5a: Frequencies of entries regarding supposed mechanisms of superstitious 
effectiveness ordered by number of responses 
 
 N  (%) 
None (missings in first response) 35 (20) 
Gives positive feelings of security and foothold 57 (33) 
Approaching the situation differently/more positive 32 (18) 
Calms down, reassures 28 (16) 
Encourages, elicits feelings of assurance 20 (12) 
Strengthens belief in oneself, enhances confidence 20 (12) 
Others 26 (15) 
 
Note, multiple responses of up to three entries were allowed. Values in parentheses 
represent the number of reports as percentages of all participants (N = 173). 
 
Table 5b: Frequencies of entries regarding supposed consequences for hindered 
superstitious practice ordered by number of responses 
 
 N (%) 
missings in first response 35 (20) 
No consequences 61 (35) 
Rising feelings of uncertainty, nervousness, 
uneasiness, fear, and panic 68 (39) 
General negative feelings 9 (5) 
Others 53 (31) 
 
Note, multiple responses of up to three entries were allowed. Values in parentheses 
represent the number of reports as percentages of all participants (N = 173). 
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Wir möchten Sie nun bitten, einige Fragen zu der soeben durchgeführten Aufgabe zu 
beantworten. 
--- 
1) Was würden Sie sagen, wie gut haben Sie bei der soeben durchgeführten Aufgabe 
abgeschnitten? 
1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
gar nicht gut sehr gut 
---  
2) Was würden Sie sagen, wie haben Sie sich während der Aufgabe gefühlt? 
1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
gar nicht gut sehr gut 
---  
3) Was würden Sie sagen, wie nervös waren Sie während der Aufgabe? 
1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
gar nicht nervös sehr nervös 
---  
4) Was würden Sie sagen, wie ruhig waren Sie während der Aufgabe? 
1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
gar nicht ruhig sehr ruhig 
---  
Vielen Dank!  
Wir möchten Sie nun noch bitten, einige Fragen zu Ihrer Person zu beantworten. 
---  
Bitte geben Sie Ihr Geschlecht an. (1 = männlich; 2 = weiblich) 
--- 
Wie alt sind Sie? (in Jahren) 
--- 
Welches Studienfach studieren Sie? 
--- 
In welchem Semester studieren Sie? 
--- 
Noch einmal Vielen Dank! 
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Vielen Dank! Sie haben die motorische Aufgabe beendet.  
 
Wir möchten Sie nun noch bitten, einige Fragen zu Ihrer Person zu beantworten. 
--- 
Bitte geben Sie Ihr Geschlecht an. (1 = männlich; 2 = weiblich) 
--- 
Wie alt sind Sie? (in Jahren) 
--- 
Welches Studienfach studieren Sie? 
--- 
In welchem Semester studieren Sie? 
--- 
Noch einmal Vielen Dank! 
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Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme! 
--- 
In der heutigen Untersuchung geht es um den Zusammenhang zwischen der Fähigkeit, sich 
an verschiedene mentale Aufgaben anpassen zu können und das erfolgreiche Abschneiden in 
allgemeinen Lebensaufgaben wie Studium oder Arbeit.  
Unsere Annahme besteht darin, dass erfolgreiches schnelles Anpassen an verschiedene 
kognitive Anforderungen mit einer flexiblen Anpassungsfähigkeit in echten 
Lebenssituationen einhergeht. Menschen, die sich schnell an neue kognitive Aufgaben 
anpassen können, sollten deshalb auch im tatsächlichen Leben erfolgreicher sein als 
Personen, denen diese Anpassung nicht so gut gelingt.  
Im Folgenden werden Sie gebeten, nacheinander zwei mentale Aufgaben mit verschiedenen 
kognitiven Anforderungen durchzuführen. Bei der ersten Aufgabe liegt der Schwerpunkt auf 
verbalen Fähigkeiten. Bei der zweiten Aufgabe wird hauptsächlich räumliches 
Vorstellungsvermögen verlangt.  
Auf den nächsten Seiten werden Ihnen die Aufgaben zunächst erklärt. 
--- 
Als erstes werden Sie eine so genannte "Wortentscheidungsaufgabe" durchführen. 
Zu diesem Zweck werden wir Ihnen eine Reihe von Buchstabenfolgen darbieten, bei denen 
Sie entscheiden sollen, ob es sich um ein Wort der deutschen Sprache handelt oder nicht. So 
sollen Sie zum Beispiel entscheiden, ob "Hut" und "Bopel" tatsächlich existierende Wörter 
sind. 
Ihre Antwort, ob eine präsentierte Buchstabenfolge ein Wort darstellt oder nicht, wird mit 
Hilfe der blauen und gelben Taste gegeben. Handelt es sich um ein WORT, so drücken Sie 
bitte die BLAUE Taste, handelt es sich um KEIN WORT, so drücken Sie bitte die GELBE 
Taste.  
Versuchen Sie bei dieser Worterkennungsaufgabe so schnell aber auch so akkurat wie 
möglich zu antworten. Legen Sie dafür breits vor Beginn der Aufgabe Ihre Zeigefinger auf 
die blaue und gelbe Taste.  
Vor der Präsentation jeder Buchstabenfolg über welche Sie entscheiden sollen, ob diese ein 
Wort oder kein Wort darstellt, wird in der Mitte des Bildschirmes ein Fixationspunkt 
dargeboten (markiert durch "XXWX"). Die Buchstabenfolgen werden genau an dieser Stelle 
erscheinen. Achten Sie darauf, dass Sie während des gesamten Versuchs diesen 
Fixationspunkt fokussieren und Ihr Blick auf den "XXWX" ruht. 
--- 
(3 Beispiel Durchgänge der Lexikalischen Entscheidungsaufgabe ohne Primes) 
--- 
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Es folgt nun die Erklärung für die zweite Aufgabe.  
Genau genommen handelt es sich dabei um das Spiel Tetris, welches Sie sicher selbst 
kennen. Tetris ist ein Denk- und Reaktionsspiel, bei dem es hauptsächlich auf räumliches 
Vorstellungsvermögen ankommt.  
Die Spielregeln sind folgende: Blöcke in verschiedenen Formen fallen nacheinander auf ein 
Spielfeld herunter. Sie müssen versuchen zu verhindern, dass diese Blöcke sich bis zum 
oberen Spielfeldrand auftürmen. Zu diesem Zweck können Sie die Blöcke während des Falls 
nach links (linke Pfeiltaste) und rechts (rechte Pfeiltaste) verschieben und auch drehen (Oben 
Pfeiltaste). Sind Sie sicher, einen Block korrekt positioniert zu haben, können Sie mittels der 
Unten Pfeiltaste das Fallen beschleunigen. Wenn es Ihnen gelingt, eine Zeile vollständig 
auszufüllen, verschwindet diese und Sie bekommen Punkte.   
--- 
Zusätzlich wird sich in regelmäßigen Abständen die Schwierigkeit des Spiels erhöhen, 
indem sich die Geschwindigkeit mit der die Formen nach unten fallen erhöht.  
Die Abfolge der herunter fallenden Formen ist zufällig und kann nicht von Ihnen beeinflusst 
werden.  
Sobald die aufeinander getürmten Formen den oberen Spielfeldrand erreicht haben, ist das 
Spiel beendet.  
Insgesamt werden Sie nur einen Versuch zur Verfügung haben. Versuchen Sie dabei, so 
lange wie möglich zu spielen und so viele Punkte wie möglich zu erzielen.  
Auch für diese Aufgabe folgt zunächst ein kurzes Übungsbeispiel, bei dem Sie sich an den 
Umgang mit den Pfeiltasten gewöhnen können. Das Übungsspiel beginnt durch Drücken der 
Leertaste und wird nach 30 Sekunden abgebrochen. 
--- 
(30 Sekunden Beispiel Tetris-Spiel) 
--- 
Die Übungsphase ist nun beendet.  
Es geht nun weiter mit der ersten Aufgabe zur Worterkennung. 
--- 
Subliminale Priming Phase mit 72 Durchgängen (siehe Subliminales Priming Material) 
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Primes:  
Glück versus Pech 
 
Letter strings practice trials:  
 Kaktus 
 wenden 
 Pritzel 
 
Letter strings critical trials: 
 
laufen 
Hamster 
krump 
Jacke 
singen 
Horn 
Mulp 
Kugel 
Leiter 
grompem 
Haus 
läutern 
Tong 
Rüssel 
fallen 
Teppich 
Bealk 
Postkarte 
zeigen 
Zebra 
fahren 
schonzem 
Tisch 
Kalender 
schreiben 
Handtuch 
julk 
Menge 
kaufen 
Bank 
Telmo 
Wiese 
Nagel 
storfen 
Kreis 
niesen 
Felk 
Flosse 
kriechen 
Decke 
Munkel 
Trompete 
suchen 
Schwan 
klettern 
litterm 
Tuch 
Gardine 
tragen 
Nashorn 
frilk 
Weste 
mixen 
Hand 
Bimst 
Lager 
Zaun 
krafftel 
Magnet 
lehren 
Punt 
Stachel 
lösen 
Belag 
Wistral 
Magazin 
nennen 
Käfer 
bestellen 
tinselm 
Besteck 
Umschlag 
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Bevor es nun mit dem Tetris-Spiel weitergeht, möchten wir Sie bitten, einige Fragen zu 
beantworten. 
--- 
Was würden Sie sagen, wie fühlen Sie sich im Moment? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
gar nicht gut  sehr gut 
--- 
Was würden Sie sagen, für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass Sie die folgende Aufgabe 
gut bewältigen? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
sehr unwahrscheinlich  sehr wahrscheinlich 
--- 
Was würden Sie sagen, wie viel Unsicherheit verspüren Sie im Moment? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  gar keine Unsicherheit   sehr viel Unsicherheit 
--- 
Was würden Sie sagen, wie zuversichtlich fühlen Sie sich in Bezug auf die nun anstehende 
Aufgabe? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  gar nicht zuversichtlich  sehr zuversichtlich 
--- 
Es beginnt nun die zweite Aufgabe - das Tetris-Spiel.  
Benutzen Sie zum verschieben und drehen der Formen wie im Übungsbeispiel die dafür 
vorgesehenen Pfeiltasten.  
Das Spiel wird so lange laufen, bis Sie mit den aufgetürmten Formen den oberen 
Spielfeldrand erreicht haben.  
Versuchen Sie, so lange wie möglich im Spiel zu bleiben und dabei so viele Punkte wie 
möglich zu erzielen. Punkte bekommen Sie für jede vervollständigte Reihe. 
Das Spiel beginnt, sobald Sie auf die Leertaste drücken. 
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Wir möchten Sie nun noch bitten, einige Fragen zu den soeben absolvieren Aufgaben und zu 
Ihrer Person zu beantworten. 
--- 
Was würden Sie sagen, wie gut haben Sie bei dem Tetris-Spiel abgeschnitten? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
gar nicht gut  sehr gut 
--- 
Was würden Sie sagen, wie wichtig war es Ihnen, beim Tetris-Spiel viele Punkte zu 
erzielen? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
gar nicht wichtig  sehr wichtig 
--- 
Bitte geben Sie Ihr Geschlecht an. (1 = männlich; 2 = weiblich) 
--- 
Wie alt sind Sie? (in Jahren) 
--- 
Welches Studienfach studieren Sie? 
--- 
In welchem Semester studieren Sie? 
--- 
Bitte erinnern Sie sich nun noch einmal kurz an die beiden Aufgaben, die Sie soeben 
durchgeführt haben.  
--- 
Ist Ihnen an diesen Aufgaben etwas Besonderes aufgefallen? (1 = ja; 2 = nein) 
(Falls ja): Was ist Ihnen an den Aufgaben Besonderes aufgefallen? 
--- 
Hatten Sie das Gefühl, dass die Aufgaben, die Sie soeben absolviert haben, sich gegenseitig 
beeinflusst haben? (1 = ja; 2 = nein) 
(Falls ja): Wie haben sich die Aufgaben gegenseitig beeinflusst? 
--- 
Bitte erinnern Sie sich noch einmal konkret an die Worterkennungsaufgabe, in der Sie 
entscheiden sollten, ob eine Buchstabenfolge ein Wort darstellt oder nicht. 
Ist Ihnen an dieser Aufgabe etwas Ungewöhnliches an den präsentierten Fixationspunkten 
(XXWX) aufgefallen? (1 = ja; 2 = nein) 
(Falls ja): Was ist Ihnen Ungewöhnliches an den Fixationspunkten aufgefallen? 
--- 
  
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Ist Ihnen aufgefallen, dass die Darbietung der Fixationspunkte kurz unterbrochen wurde?  
(1 = ja; 2 = nein) 
(Falls ja): Haben Sie irgendeine Idee, warum die Darbietung der Fixationspunkte immer 
wieder kurz unterbrochen wurde? 
--- 
Tatsächlich ist es so, dass Ihnen in der kurzen Unterbrechung der Fixationspunkte für eine 
sehr kurze Zeit ein Wort präsentiert wurde.  
Waren Sie in der Lage, dieses Wort zu erkennen?  (1 = ja; 2 = nein) 
(Falls ja): Bitte schreiben Sie das Wort auf, welches Sie erkannt haben. 
--- 
Noch einmal Vielen Dank! 
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Table 6a: Frequencies of entries regarding the object (categorized) that was brought 
to the experiment as lucky charm ordered by number of responses (N = 41) 
 N (%) 
Jewelry (necklace, ring, bracelet) 19 (46) 
Stuffed animal 8 (20) 
Animal or figure of different texture than fabric (wood, 
plastic, pottery) 6 (15) 
Stone 3 (7) 
others 5 (12) 
 
 
Table 6b: Frequencies of entries regarding the question whether the lucky charm had 
been taken to an important situation before and if so where it had been taken ordered by 
number of responses  
 N (%) 
Not taken 3 (7) 
Exams 27 (66) 
Journeys/travels 13 (32) 
All important/difficult situations  12 (29) 
Job interview 3 (7) 
others 3 (7) 
 
Note, multiple responses of up to two entries were allowed. Total amount of entered 
situations was N = 58. Values in parentheses represent the number of reports as percentages 
of all participants (N = 41). 
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Table 6c: Frequencies of entries regarding the question where the lucky charm 
usually is located when brought to an important situation ordered by number of responses  
 
 N (%) 
Around neck 14 (37) 
Backback/bag 10 (26) 
pocket 6 (16) 
Table 5 (13) 
Pen and pencil case 2 (5) 
“Mainly close by” 1 (3) 
 
Note, the total amount of entries is N = 38 as three out of 41 participants had indicated 
not to take their lucky charms to those instances. Values in parentheses represent the number 
of reports as percentages of  N = 38 participants. 
 
Table 6d: Mean and standard deviations for specific judgments on the personal lucky 
charm 
 Mean SD  
For how long have you been in the possession of 
your lucky charm? (in month) 59.7 70.2 
How important is your lucky charm to you? 
(1 = “not important at all”; 9 = very important”) 6.78 1.57 
How likely is it that you will take your lucky charm 
to the next exam or another important situation?  
(1 = “not likely at all”; 9 = “very likely”) 
7.37 1.98 
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Zustimmung zur Teilnahme 
Barbara Stoberock, Mitarbeiterin des Instituts für Psychologie, bietet Ihnen die freiwillige 
Teilnahme an einer Untersuchung. Hierbei werden Sie gebeten, ihre bestmögliche Leistung 
in einer Merkfähigkeitsaufgabe (Memory) zu erzielen, nachdem Sie zuvor einige Fragen 
beantwortet haben. Im Anschluss bitten wir Sie noch um einige wenige schriftliche 
Informationen. Insgesamt wird die Studie ca. 20 Minuten dauern. 
Die Teilnahme an der Studie führt zu keinen bekannten Risiken und alle gesammelten Daten 
werden anonym und nur für Forschungszwecke behandelt. Wenn Sie trotzdem eine Frage 
nicht beantworten wollen oder können, lassen Sie diese aus. Wenn Sie im Verlauf der Studie 
Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte an die Versuchsleitung. 
Sie können zu jeder Zeit, ohne Angabe von Gründen, die Bearbeitung der Aufgaben 
abbrechen, ohne dass Ihnen daraus Nachteile entstehen. Auf jeden Fall erhalten Sie Ihre 
Entlohnung. Sie können nachträglich Ihre Einwilligung zur Datenanalyse widerrufen. Um 
dies zu ermöglichen, bitten wir Sie am Ende der Untersuchung um die Angabe eines Codes, 
der uns erlaubt, Ihre Daten ohne Preisgabe Ihrer Anonymität nachträglich zu identifizieren 
und ggf. zu löschen. Wenden Sie sich dafür bitte an Barbara Stoberock, 0221 - 470 7915. 
Es besteht die Möglichkeit, detaillierte Informationen über die Studie zu erhalten, sobald die 
Datenerhebungen vollständig abgeschlossen sind. Dies ist voraussichtlich in 2 bis 3 Wochen 
der Fall. Nähere Informationen hierzu finden Sie auf einem Informationsblatt, welches Sie 
am Ende der Untersuchung erhalten. 
Ich stimme der Verwertung meiner hier gemachten Aussagen und Angaben als 
Datengrundlage für eine anonymisierte wissenschaftliche Auswertung und Publikation zu. 
Die Auswertung der Daten erfolgt auf Gruppenebene, d.h. es sind keine Rückschlüsse auf 
die Angaben einer konkreten Person möglich. 
  
 Nein, ich stimme nicht zu.    Ja, ich stimme zu.  
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Willkommen! 
Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich bereit erklärt haben an dieser Studie teilzunehmen.  
Bitte lesen Sie sich die folgenden Instruktionen sorgfältig durch. 
Wir möchten Sie in dieser Untersuchung darum bitten, unsere Forschung bei der 
Entwicklung eines neuen kultur- und sprachunabhängigen Tests zur Messung des 
Zusammenhangs zwischen Arbeitsstilen, kognitiver Leistung und Intelligenz zu unterstützen.  
Für diesen Test werden verschiedenen Versuchspersonen verschiedene Untertests 
vorgelegt. 
Ein besonderes Augenmerk soll im hier vorgelegten Testabschnitt auf die Erfassung 
der Merkfähigkeit und Konzentration in alltäglichen Situationen gerichtet werden. 
Empirische Studien haben gezeigt, dass hohe Werte im Testbereich Merkfähigkeit 
und Konzentration eine wichtige Voraussetzung für ein erfolgreiches Studium 
und beruflichen Erfolg darstellen. 
Die für den Testbereich wichtigen Fähigkeiten werden im Folgenden durch eine 
Aufgabe geprüft, die dem bekannten Spiel Memory sehr ähnlich ist. 
Die Instruktion für die Aufgabe befindet sich auf der nächsten Seite. 
---- 
Ihre Aufgabe besteht darin, unter umgedrehten Spielkarten alle Paare zu finden.  
Ihre Leistung ist umso besser, je schneller Sie sind und je weniger Züge Sie benötigen. 
Zu sehen ist ein Spielfeld mit 36 umgedrehten Karten, welche aus 18 Paaren bestehen  
(18 x 2 = 36). 
Durch Mausklick auf eine Karte wird deren Bild sichtbar, zwei identische Bilder bilden 
jeweils ein Paar. 
Pro Zug können Sie zwei Karten gleichzeitig ansehen, nach wenigen Sekunden decken diese 
sich jedoch von alleine wieder zu. 
Bitte versuchen Sie, alle versteckten Paare möglichst schnell und mit möglichst wenigen 
Zügen zu finden.  
Ihre Leistung wird in beiden Bereichen durch den Computer aufgezeichnet. 
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Bevor Sie nun mit der Bearbeitung der Testaufgaben beginnen, möchten wir Sie darum 
bitten einige Fragen zu Ihrer Person zu beantworten. 
Bitte klicken Sie hierfür bei den abgebildeten Skalen mit der linken Maustaste auf die 
Antwort, die für Sie am ehesten zutrifft.  
--- 
Ich denke, dass ich die mir bevorstehende Memory- Aufgabe gut bewältigen werde. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 trifft nicht zu         trifft sehr zu 
--- 
Ich gehe mit einem guten Gefühl an die mir bevorstehende Memory- Aufgabe heran. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 trifft nicht zu         trifft sehr zu 
--- 
Ich sehe der mir bevorstehende Aufgabe positiv entgegen. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 trifft nicht zu         trifft sehr zu 
--- 
Ich vertraue in meine Fähigkeiten für die Aufgabe Memory. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 trifft nicht zu         trifft sehr zu 
--- 
Was glauben Sie, wie gut werden Sie in der folgenden Memory- Aufgabe abschneiden? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       sehr gut          gar nicht gut 
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Vielen Dank für die Beantwortung der Fragen zu Ihrer Person. 
Es beginnt nun der Testabschnitt zur Erfassung der Merkfähigkeit und Konzentration. 
Wie Sie bereits wissen, beginnt dieser mit einem dem Spiel Memory ähnlichen Test. 
Bitte denken Sie daran: 
Für eine gute Leistung ist es wichtig, die Aufgabe gleichzeitig in möglichst kurzer Zeit und 
mit möglichst wenigen Zügen zu bearbeiten! 
--- 
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Vielen Dank für die Bearbeitung der Aufgabe.  
Bevor es weiter geht möchten wir Sie bitten, die folgenden Fragen zur soeben 
durchgeführten Aufgabe zu beantworten. 
--- 
Was würden Sie sagen, wie ist Ihre Stimmung in diesem Moment? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    gar nicht gut             sehr gut 
--- 
Was würden Sie sagen, wie gut haben Sie bei der soeben durchgeführten Aufgabe 
abgeschnitten? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    gar nicht gut             sehr gut 
--- 
Was würden Sie sagen, wie wichtig war es Ihnen, alle Memory-Paare möglichst schnell zu 
finden? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 gar nicht wichtig         sehr wichtig 
--- 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Mithilfe! 
Nun folgen noch einige Fragen für unsere Versuchspersonendatei. 
--- 
Bitte geben Sie Ihr Geschlecht an. (1 = männlich; 2 = weiblich) 
--- 
Wie alt sind Sie? (in Jahren) 
--- 
In welchem Semester studieren Sie? 
--- 
Haben Sie schon einmal an einem Versuch von uns teilgenommen?  (1= ja; 2 = nein) 
--- 
Ist Ihnen an dem heutigen Versuch etwas Besonderes aufgefallen? (1 = ja; 2 = nein) 
(Falls ja): Was ist Ihnen Besonderes aufgefallen? 
--- 
Haben Sie eine Idee, welche Hypothesen wir testen wollen oder was Sinn und Zweck dieser 
Untersuchung sein könnte?  (1 = ja; 2 = nein)  
(Falls ja): Was denken Sie, was könnte Sinn und Zweck dieser Untersuchung sein und 
welche Hypothesen wollen wir testen? 
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--- 
Wie Sie wissen haben wir aus Zeitgründen zwei verschiedene Untersuchungen 
zusammengelegt. Haben Sie sich hierdurch auf irgendeine Weise gestört oder beeinflusst 
gefühlt?  (1 = ja; 2 = nein) 
(Falls ja): Auf welche Art und Weise haben Sie sich durch die Zusammenlegung der 
Untersuchungen gestört oder beeinflusst gefühlt? 
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Ich versichere eidesstattlich, dass ich die von mir vorgelegte Dissertation selbständig 
und ohne unzulässige Hilfe angefertigt, die benutzten Quellen und Hilfsmittel vollständig 
angegeben und die Stellen der Arbeit einschließlich Tabellen und Abbildungen, die anderen 
Werken im Wortlaut oder dem Sinn nach entnommen sind, in jedem Einzelfall als 
Entlehnung kenntlich gemacht habe; dass diese Dissertation noch keinem anderen 
Fachbereich zur Prüfung vorgelegen hat; dass sie noch nicht veröffentlicht worden ist sowie 
dass ich eine solche Veröffentlichung vor Abschluss des Promotionsverfahrens nicht 
vornehmen werde. Die Promotionsordnung ist mir bekannt. Die von mir vorgelegte 
Dissertation ist von Prof. Dr. Thomas Mussweiler betreut worden. 
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